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Abolition of the hearsay rule would be another step in what might 
be termed the Benthamite revolution in the law of evidence. Whether 
or not they can be traced to his influence, many of the developments of 
the last hundred years have been consistent with Bentham's position 
[t]hat, merely with a view to rectitude of decision ... no species of evi-
dence whatsoever, willing or unwilling, ought to be excluded: for that 
although in certain cases it may be right that this or that lot of evidence, 
though tendered, should not be admitted, yet, in these cases, the reason 
for the exclusion rests on other grounds; viz. avoidance of vexation, ex-
pense, and delay.1 
While exclusionary rules based upon extrinsic policy have survived 
and sometimes flourished,2 those that exclude testimony as flawed by 
human weakness have decayed or disappeared. The past century has 
seen the end of rules making parties, 3 interested persons, 4 and felons5 
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. A.B. 1964, J.D. 1969, Harvard University. -
Ed. I would like to thank Daniel Farber, Barry Feld, Richard Frase, Richard Lempert, and 
Irving Younger for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. 
1. 1 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 1 (London 1827). On Bentham's 
influence, see Keeton & Marshall, Bentham's Influence on the Law of Evidence, in JEREMY BEN-
THAM AND THE LAW 79 (1948). 
Bentham himself may not have followed the full implications of the quoted passage in his 
prescription for hearsay reform. He did not advocate complete abolition of the rule against hear-
say, but rather a rule of preference, under which hearsay would be admitted if the declarant was 
unavailable. See Chadbourn, Bentham and the Hearsay Rule - A Belllhamic View of Rule 
63(4}(c) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 75 HARV. L. REV. 932, 939 (1962); W. TWINING, 
THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE 40 (1985). 
2. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (expanding protection of privilege 
against self-incrimination); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (rule excluding evidence seized in 
illegal search applied to states); cf Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (adopting 
broad view of attorney-client privilege in corporate context); Schwartzstein, The Accou11ta11t-
Clie11t Privilege, in TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES 205, 205-06, 218 (S. Stone & R. Liebman eds. 
1983); Morse & Zucker, The Journalist's Privilege, in id. at 407, 423-24 (noting that many states 
have recognized new privileges for journalists and accountants). But see Harris v. New York, 
401 U.S. 222 (1971) (illegally obtained confessions admissible to impeach); Trammel v. United 
States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (placing limits on marital privilege). 
3. See 2 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN 
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW§§ 576-577 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE]. 
4. Id. 
5. See id. § 519. Wigmore specifically gave Bentham's "irresistible" attack credit for the 
movement that led to the disappearance of the disqualification for persons who had been con-
victed of a crime. Id. at 610. 
51 
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incompetent; more recently, in many jurisdictions, the principle has 
swept away the dead man's statute6 and the incompetency of insane 
persons, infants, and intoxicated persons.7 The testimony has been ad-
mitted on the principle, often regarded as virtually self-evident, that it 
is better to admit flawed testimony for what it is worth, giving the 
opponent a chance to expose its defects, than to take the chance of a 
miscarriage of justice because the trier is deprived of information. 
Academic commentators have generally supported this principle, 
and have sought to use it as a basis for admitting hearsay more freely. 
While a newcomer to hearsay might suppose that the hearsay nde was 
the creation of a law professor in search of tricky classroom hypotheti-
cals, in actuality the legal scholars of this century have tended to be 
supporters of simplification or abolition, 8 while the practicing bar has 
tended to defend the rule and tolerate its intricacies.9 In 1942, the 
6. Dead man's statutes prohibit testimony by an interested party about transactions with a 
deceased person in an action initiated or defended by the executor or administrator of the dccc· 
dent's estate. They are intended to prevent fraud by the survivor. Twenty states repealed their 
dead man's statutes in conjunction with adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, see Wroth, 
The Federal Rules of Evidence in the States: A Ten-Year Perspective, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1315, 
1336-37 (1985), and others have mitigated the effect of the statute by substituting a requirement 
of corroboration for an absolute rule of incompetency, see C. McCORMICK, McCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE§ 65, at 160 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE]. 
7. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, insane persons, children, and intoxicated persons 
are competent as witnesses; their conditions go to the weight, not the admissibility, of their tcsti· 
mony. See FED. R. EvID. 601. At least 19 states have adopted rule 60l's position on compe· 
tency, but a number of others retain disqualifications for persons whose mental state or 
immaturity render them unable to testify accurately. See Wroth, supra note 6, at 1336-37; Mc-
CORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 6, § 62. 
8. See, e.g., 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW§ 8(c), at 642-45 (Til-
lers rev. ed. 1983) [hereinafter WIGMORE (Tillers ed.)); 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
COMMON LAW §§ 1427, 1576 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974) [hereinafter WIGMORE (Chadbourn 
ed.)]; Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REV. 331, 334-35 & nn.71-87 (1961); C. 
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE§§ 300-305 (1954); J. MAGUIRE, EVI• 
DENCE: COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 147-65 (1947); Morgan, Foreword to MODEL 
CODE OF EVIDENCE 36-50 (1942); id. at 217-24 (introductory note to hearsay chapter); Morgan 
& Maguire, Looking Backward and Fonvard at Evidence, SO HARV. L. REV. 909, 918-22 (1937). 
However, scholars who have written of hearsay as an aspect of the constitutional right to 
confrontation have often taken a different attitude, advocating interpretations that would lend to 
substantial exclusion of hearsay. See Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co·Conspira· 
tor Exception in Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1378 (1972); 
Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another 
One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 129 (1972); Seidelson, Hearsay Exceptions and the Sixth Amendmelll, 
40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 76, 91-92 (1971); The Supreme Court. 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. REV. 
63, 236-38 (1968); Note, Constitutional Law - Confrontation Clause - Admission at Trial of 
Slain Informant's Prior Grand Jury Testimony Against Defendants Does Not Violate Coufronta· 
tion Guarantee Despite Lack of Cross-Examination, 31 VAND. L. REV. 682, 694 (1978). Other 
confrontation clause commentators have advocated a relatively strict attitude toward hearsay 
when the declarant is available. See Westen, The Future of Confrontation, 77 MICH. L. REV. 
1185 (1979); cf. Kirkpatrick, Confrontation and Hearsay: Exemptions from the Co11sti111tio11al 
Unavailability Requirement, 70 MINN. L. REV. 665 (1986) (considers types of hearsay that 
should be exempt from the unavailability requirement). 
9. See authorities cited at notes 27, 31, 43 & 45 infra. 
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American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence proposed a sweep-
ing change, under which hearsay would have been freely admitted 
when the declarant was unavailable. 10 The Model Code was never 
adopted in any state, partly because of its radical attitude toward hear-
say reform. 11 The fate of the 1953 Uniform Rules of Evidence, which 
offered a more limited version of hearsay reform, 12 was almost as dis-
mal.13 In 1973, the Supreme Court sought to use its rulemaking 
power to accomplish a limited relaxation of restrictions on admission 
of hearsay, 14 but Congress prevented the Court's Rules from going 
into effect and subsequently rewrote them. The Federal Rules of Evi-
dence emerged from Congress in 1975 with most of the traditional 
limitations on the reception of hearsay intact, though Congress per-
mitted the Rules to contain residual exceptions, hedged with limita-
tions, that may have given courts greater freedom to admit hearsay 
that does not fall under traditional exceptions. 15 Thus, while we have 
seen steps toward freer admissibility, radical reform has fallen short of 
the goals set by its proponents, and it has fallen far short of the 
10. Rule 503 of the Model Code of Evidence provided that "[e]vidence of a hearsay declara-
tion is admissible if the judge finds that the declarant (a) is unavailable as a witness, or (b) is 
present and subject to cross-examination." MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 503 (1942). 
11. See 21 c. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 5005, at 88-
89 (1977); Chadbourn, supra note 1, at 945 and authorities cited therein. 
12. Rule 63(4)(c) of the Uniform Rules provided an exception, applicable when the declarant 
was unavailable as a witness, for 
a statement narrating, describing or explaining an event or condition which the judge finds 
was made by the declarant at a time when the matter had been recently perceived by him 
and while his recollection was clear, and was made in good faith prior to the commencement 
of the action. 
UNIF. R. EVID. 63(4)(c) (1953) (superceded 1974). 
13. See 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5005, at 89-91 (reporting that in the 
15 years after they were approved, the Uniform Rules were adopted in only two states). 
14. In the version of the Federal Rules of Evidence originally promulgated by the Supreme 
Court, the residual exceptions to the hearsay rules were more liberal in scope than the ones that 
eventually emerged from Congress. They contained no notice provision or requirement that the 
evidence be superior to other means of proof; the residual exceptions required only that a state-
ment have guarantees of trustworthiness that were "comparable" to those of the established 
exceptions. See FED. R. EvID. 803(24}, 804(b)(6) (Supreme Court Proposed Draft 1973), re-
printed ill 2 J. BAILEY & 0. TRELLES, THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORIES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS, Doc. 7, at 32-33 (1980) [hereinafter BAILEY & TREL-
LES]. For the more limited residual exception that emerged from Congress, see text at note 15 
infra. The Supreme Court proposal also provided that statements of recent perception of un-
available declarants be admitted. FED. R. EvID. 804{b){2) (Supreme Court Proposed Draft 
1973), reprinted in BAILEY & TRELLES, supra, at 33. This exception was eliminated by Congress. 
15. The residual exceptions now provide for the reception of 
[a] statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having 
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the 
statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the 
point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure 
through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of 
justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a state-
ment may not be admitted under [the residual exceptions] unless the proponent of it makes 
known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the 
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changes in other areas where evidence was once excluded to protect 
juries from their own mistakes. 
None of the three major reform proposals - the Model Code, the 
Uniform Rules, or the original Federal Rules - incorporated a sys-
tematic distinction between civil and criminal cases. The thesis of this 
article is that this distinction should be adopted. This article will ex-
plore the reasons for excluding hearsay, and conclude that they sup-
port different sets of rules in civil and criminal cases. In civil cases, 
rules excluding hearsay should be curtailed. Hearsay that fits under 
an establish~d exception should be admitted, and other hearsay, with-
out discretionary screening by the trial judge, should be admitted on 
proper notice. In criminal cases, however, the conventional reasons 
for excluding hearsay apply more strongly, and the hearsay rules serve 
the additional function of shielding the accused against misuse of gov-
ernmental power. The principal features of the present rules should be 
retained, and rulemakers should consider codifying incremental 
changes that tailor the rules so that they deal more particularly with 
issues that arise in criminal cases. 
l. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ADMITTING OR EXCLUDING HEARSAY 
The primary argument for admitting hearsay is simple and power-
ful: hearsay can be convincing evidence, and it is the sort of evidence 
on which we routinely rely in the most important affairs of home, 
state, and business.16 This argument has its greatest force when the 
hearsay declarant is unavailable, and the choice is between admitting 
the hearsay declaration or having nothing at all. In such circum-
stances, the proponents of free admission argue, doubts about the reli-
ability of hearsay should go to its weight, not its admissibility, and the 
trier of fact should be trusted to give the evidence its proper value. 17 
adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the state-
ment and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant. 
FED. R. Evm. 803(24), 804(b)(5). 
The specific recognition of residual exceptions may have encouraged reception of hearsay that 
does not fall under traditional exceptions. However, some courts had already recognized a com-
mon-law power to admit reliable hearsay that did not fit the traditional exceptions. See, e.g., 
Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961). The residual 
exceptions, by including limitations such as notice, may have restricted this power rather than 
enlarging it. 
16. E.g., J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 123 (1949); A. OSBORN, THE MIND OF THE JUROR 
AS JUDGE OF THE FACTS, OR, THE LAYMAN'S VIEW OF THE LAW 51-52 (1937); McCormick, 
The New Code of Evidence of the American Law Institute, 20 TEXAS L. REV. 661, 671 (1942). 
See also Davis, Hearsay in Administrative Hearings. 32 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 689 (1964). 
17. See, e.g., James, The Role of Hearsay in a Rational Scheme of Evidence, 34 ILL. L. REV. 
788, 794-95 (1940); Note, The Theoretical Foundations of the Hearsay Rules, 93 HARV. L. REV. 
1786, 1804-07 (1980). 
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Even when the declarant is available, however, use of hearsay may be 
the most convenient method of producing testimony, and the opportu-
nity of the opponent to call the declarant for cross-examination gives 
the opponent a means of ensuring that the facts are adequately· 
explored. 
Even beyond this principal argument for receiving hearsay, there 
are worthy secondary arguments. The Anglo-American tradition of 
oral proceedings is arduous for witnesses, who would be saved vexa-
tion, expense, and inconvenience if their testimony could be taken in 
the form of affidavit or deposition. Moreover, the exclusion of hearsay 
can encourage the intimidation of witnesses, or at least deprive the 
courts of means of countering it. For example, a criminal defendant 
may use threats or violence against a witness who has given a state-
ment to the prosecution, ~nd if the witness recants or disappears, the 
hearsay rule will frequently prevent the statement from being used in 
evidence. 18 Finally, abolition of the hearsay rule, with its many excep-
tions and complicated quiddities, would greatly simplify the law of 
evidence. 19 It would also allow witnesses to tell their stories in a more 
natural fashion, and prevent them from being confused by admoni-
tions from the bench. 20 
While the arguments for admitting hearsay are relatively simple, 
arguments for excluding it tend to be subtle and procedurally com-
plex. The conventional explanation for the exclusion of hearsay cen-
ters on the danger of admitting evidence whose reliability has not been 
tested. Courtroom witnesses testify under oath, in the presence of the 
trier, and subject to cross-examination. Hearsay declarants avoid 
these courtroom safeguards, which both encourage witnesses to be ac-
curate and expose defects in their credibility. Cross-examination is es-
pecially valuable for testing credibility because it explores weaknesses 
in a declarant's memory, perception, narrative ability, and sincerity. 
Thus, hearsay's fundamental evidentiary flaw is the absence of an op-
portunity to reveal an out-of-court declarant's weaknesses through 
18. See M. GRAHAM, WITNESS INTIMIDATION xi-xii, 125-27 (1985). 
19. Comment, Abolish the Rule Against Hearsay, 35 U. PITT. L. REV. 609, 628 (1974). Cf P .. 
MURPHY & D. BARNARD, Evidence and Advocacy, 19 (1984): 
There should probably be an organisation called "Hearsay Anonymous." Membership 
would be open to those judges, practitioners and students (not to mention occasional law 
teachers) to whom the rule against hearsay has always been an awesome and terrifying 
mystery. Like its partner in terror, the rule against perpetuities, the rule against hearsay 
ranks as one of the law's most celebrated nightmares. To many practitioners, it is a dimly 
remembered vision, which conjures up confused images of complex exceptions and incom-
prehensible and antiquated cases. 
20. LAW REFORM COMMITTEE, THIRTEENTH REPORT, 1J 40 (1966); cf 5 WJGMORE 
(Chadbourn ed.), supra note 8, § 1427, at 264 (arguing for flexibility in use of the hearsay rule in 
combination with rigorous cross-examination to expose weaknesses in the testimony). 
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cross-examination. 2 1 
Wigmore, a leading exponent of this explanation, tried to show 
that the lack of opportunity to test reliability with cross-examination 
was the sole basis for the hearsay ban. 22 He disparaged jurists who 
said that hearsay statements should be excluded because the in-court 
witness might report them inaccurately, or because admission of hear-
say might lead to fraud, by cataloguing quotes from their opinions 
under the label "Spurious Theories of the Hearsay Rule. "23 Other 
scholars have expressly or implicitly supported this view.24 
This "untested declarant" theory of hearsay does not tell the whole 
story about why hearsay is excluded. The history of the hearsay rule 
indicates that lawmakers had a number of other concerns,25 and these 
concerns are reflected in the structure of the hearsay rule and its 
exceptions. 26 
The first of these additional concerns is the danger that the in-
court witness will inaccurately report the out-of-court statement. This 
raises different considerations than does concern about the accuracy of 
the out-of-court declarant. The witness reporting the declarant's out-
of-court statement is in court, under oath, and subject to cross-exami-
nation. These safeguards are supposed to encourage accurate report-
ing and, in any event, give the trier ample basis for deciding whether 
the witness is describing the hearsay statement accurately. Nonethe-
less, lawyers and judges have often supported exclusion on grounds 
that the in-court witness may be inaccurate.27 This view is in con-
21. See, e.g., G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 159-60 (1978); 5 
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 1362, at 7. 
22. 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 1362, at 7. Though Wigmore offered this 
explanation for excluding hearsay, he himself ultimately became an advocate of reform that 
would have given trial judges much more leeway in receiving hearsay. See id. § 1427. 
23. Id. § 1363. 
24. See, e.g., Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957 (1974); G. LILLY, supra 
note 21, at 159-60. 
25. See text at notes 27-56 infra. 
26. See text at notes 67-152 infra. 
27. See, e.g., Report of Committee on Administration of Justice on Model Code of Evidence, 19 
CAL ST. B.J. 262, 274 (1944) [hereinafter Report]. After first noting that the accuracy of hearsay 
statements cannot be tested by cross-examination, the Committee wrote: 
But the real objection goes even deeper. If cross-examination were to be done away with 
entirely and the truth of an issue were to be determined wholly upon the direct examination 
of witnesses produced by each party, still we would be as strongly opposed to the proposed 
rule. We believe that experience has shown that, laying aside entirely questions of perjury, 
corrupt motives or interest in one party or the other, that one of the most common occur-
rences is for one man to misunderstand the statements or declarations of another. We be-
lieve that few days pass that any lawyer or layman, if he will search his mind, will not recall 
some instance in which an associate or member of his family has attributed to him state-
ments that were inaccurate. We do not believe there is a trial lawyer of any great experience 
who has not learned that in a majority of cases when a client asserts that John Jones was 
present and will fully corroborate him, the client, and recites what Jones will bear witness 
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formity with the layperson's notion of the dangers of hearsay- exem-
plified by the maxim "a tale twice told is a tale altered" - so it is not 
surprising that it is reflected in the law as well. 
This justification for exluding hearsay depends upon the belief that 
a witness describing an out-of-court statement is likely to be less relia-
ble than a witness describing nonverbal events, or at least that cross-
examination will be less effective on a witness to a statement. This 
belief may arise from a sense that human memory does not record 
verbal information as accurately as visual information.28 Speech is 
often difficult to perceive, and people tend to hear what they want to 
hear. Moreover, as Lempert and Saltzburg point out,29 minor mistakes 
in perceiving statements can radically change the meaning of what was 
said - as would be the case, for example, if a witness believed that the 
declarant had said "does" when in fact the declarant said "doesn't." 
The danger that the in-court witness will distort or fabricate a 
statement is increased by the difficulty of detection. Under a condition 
of free admissibility of hearsay, the person who wanted to concoct a 
hearsay statement would be free to choose a time and place at which 
no one was present but the witness and the supposed declarant, and 
thus it would be difficult to show that the statement was never made, 
especially if the declarant was no longer available.30 Moreover, it is 
to, that when John Jones is interviewed he gives an entirely different version from that of the 
client. 
See also authorities cited in note 31 infra. 
Some academic commentators have accepted the danger of misreport by the in-court witness 
as one of the bases for excluding hearsay. See McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 6, § 245, 
at 727; R. LEMPERT & s. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 520-21 (2d ed. 
1982). 
28. For a commentator who advances this theory, see Stewart, Perception, Memory, and 
Hearsay: A Criticism of Present Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. 
REV. 1, 19. Stewart states that "[p]eople generally retain verbal discriptions [sic] of events less 
accurately than they do visual perceptions," and cites G. ALLPORT & L. POSTMAN, THE PSY-
CHOLOGY OF RUMOR 59-60 (1947). However, the Allport and Postman distinction between "in-
dividual memory" (the report of a person with first-hand knowledge) and "social memory" 
(reports transmitted through a group) provides, at best, only indirect support for this hypothesis. 
Allport and Postman noted errors in serial reproduction of drawings, id. at 57-59, as well as in 
serial reproductions of oral statements, and they did not directly compare the accuracy ,or re-
trieval of visual and verbal information. Compare P. Miene, Memory for Verbal Statements vs. 
Memory for Visual Observations 3 (1986) (unpublished manuscript on file at University of Min-
nesota Law School Library), which reviews the literature and concludes: "In general, there ap-
pears to be no empirical validation of the assumption that the encoding and retrieval of out-of-
court visual observations is more accurate than for out-of-court statements." 
29. R. LEMPERT & s. SALTZBURG, supra note 27, at 520. 
30. Cf. id. at 520-21: 
Significant statements are often directed at just one person, while significant events are often 
observed by many. Thus the possibility of questioning a misreported statement through the 
testimony of other witnesses will generally be less than the possibility of questioning an 
erroneous observation through the testimony of others. Furthermore, it will be particularly 
hard to prove perjury when statements are attributed to an anonymous or unavailable de-
clarant, so the temptation to perjury may increase. 
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difficult to cross-examine someone who is only reporting another's 
out-of-court statement. As Chief Justice Kent wrote, 
A person who relates a hearsay is not obliged to enter into any particu-
lars, to answer any questions, to solve any difficulties, to reconcile any 
contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any ambiguities: he 
in trenches himself in the simple assertion that he was told so, and leaves 
the burden entirely on his dead or absent author. 31 
The two risks I have mentioned - inaccuracy of a declarant's out-
of-court statement and inaccurate testimony by an in-court witness 
about another's out-of-court statement - create a danger that unrelia-
ble evidence will be presented to the trier. Mere unreliability, how-
ever, is a weak basis for exclusion; after all, evidence of doubtful 
reliability is routinely admitted in modem courts, on the assumption 
that the trier can recognize the infirmities in the testimony and take 
them into account in evaluating it. Thus, testimony of an interested 
party, even one who is a convicted perjurer, is received though it may 
be less reliable than the hearsay statement of a disinterested observer. 
Mere unreliability might be a sufficient basis for a rule of preference, 
which excludes hearsay when better evidence is available in the form 
of in-court testimony by the declarant. It cannot, however, explain 
our present hearsay rule, which often excludes hearsay even when the 
declarant is unavailable and the choice is between admitting hearsay 
or hearing nothing on the point at all. When the declarant is unavail-
able, unreliability cannot be a sufficient basis for exclusion unless we 
31. Coleman v. Southwick, 9 Johns. 45, 50 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1812) (quoting source not indi· 
cated). See also R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 27, at 520 ("Cross-examination is less 
likely to be effective in testing reports of statements than in testing reports of more complex 
events. ");id. at 520 n.38: 
If a witness claims to have heard but a single statement, he may plausibly claim that was all 
that was said to him .... While the examiner may question the witness about his surround· 
ings, a failure to closely observe one·s surroundings does not necessarily suggest inattention 
to matters overheard. The witness must, of course, convince the jury that he was in a posi· 
tion to overhear, but usually this will only involve establishing his distance from the convcr· 
sation. The attorney who investigates the scene is unlikely to find barriers to sound which 
would render certain versions of how a statement was heard suspect. Unreliable aspects of 
visual observations are much more susceptible to exposure through cross-examination. If a 
witness remembers only a single aspect of an event, that in itself is suspect. 
For other expressions of fear about fabrication by the in-court witness, see, for example, 
Ellicott v. Pearl, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 412, 436 (1836) (Story, J.) (besides lacking oath and cross-
examination, the fault of hearsay is "that it is peculiarly liable to be obtained by fraudulent 
contrivances"); Mirna Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290. 296 (1813) (Marshall, J.) 
(speaking of the "frauds which might be practiced'. in the absence of the hearsay rule); En· 
glebretson v. Industrial Accident Commn., 170 Cal. 793. 798, 151 P. 421, 423 (1915) (Shaw, J.) 
(same); Report, supra note 27, at 274-75 ("[W]hen the self-interest which actuates parties to 
litigation and their friends and witnesses is considered, the chance of perpetration of actual fraud 
by either or both parties equals, if it does not exceed, the chance of inaccuracy that would be 
inherent in hearsay testimony of truthful witnesses."). Cf. Morgan, Foreword to MODEL Com; 
OF EVIDENCE 6 (1942) (prevention of perjury "is the notion that is constantly urged against the 
expansion of exceptions to the hearsay rule"). 
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assume that the jury32 is likely to overvalue the testimony. Moreover, 
we must assume that the jury will overvalue the testimony to such an 
extent that it is better to exclude the testimony than to admit it and to 
have it be given too much respect. In other words, we must suppose 
not only that the jury will overvalue the testimony~ but that the dis-
crepancy between the value that the jury assigns to the testimony and 
its true value will be so great that it is better not to hear the testimony 
at all. 
The validity of this supposition has remained a matter of fireside 
induction. Perhaps it would be possible to test its validity by soci~l 
science methods, but so far hearsay experiments 'have focused on mat-
ters such as the validity of particular exceptions, not upon the question 
whether jurors overvalue hearsay testimony.33 The lack of empirical 
data, however, has not foreclosed debate. The view that the jury is not 
qualified to assess hearsay evidence has frequently been attacked, 
either on grounds that the jury can accurately assess the testimony,34 
or that any error it makes is likely to be minor in comparison to the 
value of the testimony.35 Proponents of free admission draw' tempting 
comparisons between the use of hearsay in ordinary life and its use in 
32. In this article, the fact finder is usually assumed to be ,the jury, since the hearsay rule, 
while theoretically applicable in both bench trials and jury trials, has far less force in ~ench trials. 
In bench trials, the judge who erroneously admits hearsay is unlikely to be reversed because of 
the doctrine that if the verdict is supported by admissible evidence, the judgment will not be 
reversed because the judge received evidence that was inadmissible. This doctrine has led to a 
more relaxed attitude toward hearsay in nonjury cases. See Davis, Hearsay in Nonjury Cases: 83 
HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1970). 
33. See generally Stewart, supra note 28, and authorities cited therein. My own review of the 
literature has failed to reveal any direct study of jury overvaluation of hearsay. Cf Kelman, 
Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293, 319 (1984) (using hearsay evaluation as an example ofa subject 
on which experiments are possible but will never be carried out). It is possible that research on 
fundamental attribution error will provide some insights into jurors' tendencies to overrate the 
sincerity of declarants who have not been contradicted or cross-examined, but it is difficult to 
generalize from current research to conclusions about the use of hearsay. Cf Jones, Tlze Rocky 
Road from Acts to Dispositions, 34 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 107 (1979) (arguing that the functional 
effects of attributional error are unclear). 
34. See Weinstein, supra note 8, at 335; Nesson, Tlze Evidence or tlze Event? On Judicial 
Proof and tlze Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1372 (1985). 
35. See Comment, supra note 19; Note, supra note 17, at 1789-90, 1815. The latter Note 
attempts to quantify the point that jury error is minor, and to show that it is unlikely that jury 
mistakes in evaluating testimony will be serious enough to justify exclusion. The Note appears to 
take the position that exclusion is not justified unless the jury mistakenly assigns 'an item of 
evidence a value that is at least twice its real value. Otherwise, the evidence should be admitted, 
since the "gap" between real value and assessed value is less than the real value of the evidence. 
Thus, if on a scale of 100 the real value of the evidence is 51, the evidence should never be 
excluded since, even if the jury assigns it a value of 100, the "gap" between real value and as-
signed value is only 49, which is less than the real value of the evidence. Id. at 1789-90. This 
seems wrong, at least if the numbers are taken as representing probabilities, and it is hard to see 
what else they could be. Suppose, for example, that in a criminal case the only evidence of guilt 
is a hearsay statement, and the jury considers the statement to be absolutely reliable proof that 
the defendant committed the crime, while actually the evidence establishes a 51% probability 
that defendant committed the crime. Since the standard of proof is guilt beyond a reasonable 
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the courtroom. McCormick noted that if the hearsay rule were applied 
out of court, it would "bring all business to a standstill."36 Writing 
from a layperson's point of view, a former juror has put the case well: 
The jurors who are new observers to these proceedings are astonished at 
some of the things that are done here but are more astonished at some of 
the things that are not permitted. One of the more intelligent members 
calls attention in a most emphatic manner to the fact that in investiga-
tions anywhere out of court, everybody connected with the affair in any 
way, directly or remotely, would without restraint be asked to tell every-
thing about it that would throw any light on the problem. 
A manufacturer or business man, or special investigator or arbitra-
tor, who seeks to discover all the facts in any matter under inquiry, does 
not tie his own hands by certain of these artificial rules formulated by 
those dead and gone to their reward years and years ago. 
To admit any tinge of hearsay, we learn is a positive error that is not 
negligible, and there seems to be a special antipathy to this sort of testi-
mony when, as a matter of fact, in the ordinary affairs of life hearsay is a 
well-recognized source of information, not of course to be implicitly de-
pended upon but often helpful as one of the steps in an investigation. 
Some of these rules apparently are based on the assumption that 
those who listen to the evidence, our jury for example, are of very low 
mentality and cannot distinguish between the force of what one himself 
knows and what he heard said with the information as to who said it.37 
To many, Bentham's more general point about the law of evidence -
that in finding the truth, the sages of the law have displayed less wis-
dom than the illiterate peasant doing justice within the circle of his 
family - must seem particularly applicable to the hearsay rule.38 
Perhaps, however, there is more to be said about the risk of mis-
valuation that one finds in the literature advocating radical reform of 
the hearsay rule. Jurors may use hearsay intelligently in ordinary life, 
but a trial is not ordinary life. They must judge the motives and truth-
doubt, justice would be served by excluding the evidence, even though the jury's assessment of it 
(100%) creates a gap (49%) that is smaller than its real value (51%). 
36. McCormick, The New Code of Evidence of the American Law /11stit11te, 20 TEXAS L. 
REV. 661, 671 (1942). 
37. A. OSBORN, supra note 16, at 51-52. See also J. FRANK, supra note 16, at 123: 
Now doubtless hearsay should often be accepted with caution. But 90% of the evidence on 
which men act out of court, most of the data on which business and industry daily rely, 
consists of the equivalent of hearsay. Yet, because of distrust of juries - a belief that jurors 
lack the competence to make allowance for the second-hand character of hearsay - such 
evidence, although accepted by administrative agencies, juvenile courts and legislative com-
mittees, is (subject, to be sure, to numerous exceptions) barred in jury trials. As a con~e­
quence, frequently the jury cannot learn of matters which would lead an intelligent person 
to a more correct knowledge of the facts. 
See also Davis, supra note 16 (arguing that probative value, and not hearsay, should be the rule 
for admissibility). 
38. 1 J. BENTHAM, supra note 1, at 5-6. Bentham added: "The peasant wants only to be 
taught, the lawyer to be untaught: an operation painful enough, even to ordinary pride; but to 
pride exalted and hardened by power, altogether unendurable." Jd. at 8 (emphasis in original). 
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fulness of persons whom they would ordinarily never meet, in a for-
mal, ritualized proceeding unlike anything in their ordinary affairs, a 
proceeding in which finding the truth may require an understanding of 
institutional practices with which they have little or no dealings. The 
problem is particularly sharp in criminal cases. 39 
Moreover, it is misleading to write about the valuation of hearsay 
as if the trial involved only a single piece of evidence. The jury is not 
usually confronted with a single hearsay statement that it must, in iso-
lation, decide to credit or not. Hearsay evidence often must be 
weighed against other evidence, including testimony by in-court wit-
nesses. Weighing a hearsay statement against contradictory testimony 
that has been subjected to courtroom cross-examination is, obviously, 
unnecessary in ordinary life. 
In assessing hearsay statements, jurors may also be faced with un-
familiar tasks in determining whether the statement, as reported to 
them, fully and accurately portrays the declarant's observations. They 
may be unfamiliar with ways in which professional statement-takers, 
with an eye to litigation, can twist and distort without actually lying.40 
Fabricated statements in criminal cases raise a special problem. 
The trier of fact may be quite aware that witnesses in criminal cases 
often fabricate. It is, however, sometimes a heroic task to decide that 
a particular witness has fabricated a particular statement, especially 
since cross-examination may be less effective in revealing outright 
fabrication than in revealing other testimonial defects.41 This problem 
cuts both ways. A jury may be quite willing to believe that a defen-
39. See text at notes 181-209 infra. 
40. The problem is exacerbated in situations where one of the attorneys has had the opportu-
nity to prepare the out-of-court declarant, as when the proffered statement is an affidavit pre-
pared by the attorney and signed by the witness. Here, both sides have "sandpapered" their 
witnesses, but only one has had the opportunity to expose the sandpapering through cross-exami-
nation. Jurors may not be familiar with sophisticated ways of implying something without actu-
ally saying it, or of omitting information in a way that makes the affidavit literally true but false 
in its implications. For example, an affidavit saying that ballistics tests were "consistent" with 
the proposition that the bullet came from the defendant's pistol might mean only that the bullet 
could have come from the defendant's pistol or any other pistol. Yet the statement could be 
interpreted by the jury to mean that the tests proved that the bullet came from the defendant's 
pistol. Cf. Morgan, The Hearsay Rule, 12 WASH. L. REV. 1, 5 (1937) (describing ballistics testi-
mony in the Sacco-Vanzetti case). Similarly, an affidavit stating that the driver applied the 
brakes "at the approximate point of impact" could mean that the driver applied the brakes only 
after running down the pedestrian, but might not be taken in that sense. 
41. See, e.g., Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept,_ 62 
HARV. L. REV. 177, 186 (1948): 
[I]f a witness is willing to commit perjury and counsel is willing to co-operate, neither oath 
nor cross-examination will be of much avail to expose the willful falsehood unless either 
witness or counsel is unusually stupid .... Although the exposure of willful falsehood is the 
most dramatic function of skillful cross-examination, it is very rarely demonstrated. 
Accord Finman, Implied Assertions as Hearsay: Some Criticisms of the Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence, 14 STAN. L. REV. 682, 690-91 and authorities cited in n.22 (1962). 
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dant would fabricate evidence to escape conviction. Yet when that 
evidence, if believed, establishes a complete defense, it may raise area-
sonable doubt despite skepticism about defendants in general - par-
ticularly when the jury has been told time and again to ignore the fact 
that the defendant has been arrested and charged and to give him the 
presumption of innocence.42 
The danger that the trier of fact will give too much weight to the 
evidence is not the only reason for excluding hearsay. Bar groups and 
others have advanced a variety of additional concerns. In particular, 
bar groups have repeatedly expressed the fear that if hearsay were 
freely admitted, trial preparation would become more difficult, and the 
danger of unfair surprise at trial would increase.43 
The danger of unfair surprise cannot be dismissed lightly. The uni-
tary nature of the American trial makes surprise a greater danger than 
in other systems, where adjournments and continuances can mitigate 
its effect. Attorneys need time and preparation to be ready to impeach 
witnesses, to contradict them with the testimony of others, and to con-
struct arguments dealing with their testimony. The attorney may be 
prepared to impeach or contradict the witness on the stand, but not to 
do so for declarants whose out-of-court statements come in unexpect-
edly through the mouth of the witness. Of course, surprise can be 
avoided or made less likely by discovery and pretrial notice, but those 
safeguards add to the burden and expense of pretrial preparation. 
42. The problem has arisen in cases involving witnesses who testify that third parties have 
confessed to the crime with which defendant is charged. Of course, juries reject complete·defense 
evidence every day, as when they refuse to believe alibi witnesses. When witnesses report in 
detail on their own observations of nonverbal conduct, however, the cross-examiner may be able 
to do more to undermine the testimony than when a witness reports an out-of-court statement. 
In the latter case, the witness who has testified to a perfect opportunity to hear the statement can 
then entrench himself in the assertions of the out-of-court declarant, without resolving any difli· 
culties. See text at note 31 supra. 
43. See Rules of Evidence (Supplement): Hearings Before the Subcomm. 011 Criminal Justice 
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., !st Sess., 74 (1973) [hereinafter House Evidence 
Rules Hearings] (statement of American College of Trial Lawyers asserting that broad admissi-
bility of hearsay will "make it impossible for a trial counsel adequately to prepare the case for 
trial since he will not and cannot know what evidence he will have to meet until it faces him in 
the' courtroom"), reprillled in 3 BAILEY & TRELLES, supra note 14, Doc. 12, at 74; id. at 290 
(statement of the Study Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence of the District of Columbia 
Bar Association asserting that unfairness may result from surprise and a "novel offer" of hearsay 
evidence); HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FED. RUI.ES OF EVIDENCE, H.R. REP. No. 650, 
93d Cong., 1st Sess., 5-6 (1973), reprillled in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMJN. Ni:.ws 7075, 
7079 and in 4 BAILEY & TRELLES, supra note 14, Doc. 13, at 5-6 (explaining Committee's dele-
tion of residual exceptions on grounds that they would have the effect of "injecting too much 
uncertainty into the law of evidence and impairing the ability of practitioners to prepare for 
trial"). Cf. Coleman v. Southwick, 9 Johns. 45, 50 (N.Y. 1812) (holding that the omission of 
hearsay testimony could result in unfairness). The final version of the residual exceptions sought 
to meet the surprise objection by putting in a requirement that notice be given before trial of 
intent to offer evidence under the exceptions. See FED. R. Evm. 803(24), 804(b)(5). 
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Also, if radical reform takes the form not of abolishing the hearsay 
rule but of making the exclusion of hearsay discretionary, surprise can 
operate in the other direction: the attorney who expected his evidence 
to be admissible may be surprised by a discretionary exclusion, and 
unprepared to offer substitute evidence. 
Bar groups have also raised the specter of misuse of judicial discre-
tion. Most advocates of hearsay reform would not make hearsay ad-
missible without limit, but would give trial judges discretion to admit 
or exclude in appropriate cases.44 The fear of unbridled discretion has 
been one of the bar's primary reasons for opposing these proposals for 
broader admission of hearsay.45 
Radical change in the hearsay rule could have other undesirable 
effects. For example, the free admission of hearsay might hamper pre-
trial dismissal of weak cases. Rule 56 provides that affidavits submit-
ted in support of or opposition to summary judgment motions must be 
based on personal knowledge and present evidence that would be ad-
missible at trial. Sometimes proponents fail because their affidavits of-
fer nothing but hearsay evidence on an essential element.46 If the 
hearsay rule were abolished, a plaintiff resisting a motion for summary 
judgment would only have to aver that someone had told him that he 
had observed the crucial fact. In a period of concern about expanding 
litigation, one might question whether hearsay evidence that is too 
weak to be received under the existing exceptions ought to be strong 
enough to allow a party to proceed to trial. 
Next, free admission might encourage jury lawlessness. This con-
cern materializes when hearsay evidence enables its proponent to over-
come a motion for a directed verdict. The jury, in reaching its 
decision, may appreciate the unreliability of the hearsay but nonethe-
less award a verdict in favor of the proponent because it rejects or 
44. See, e.g., Younger, Reflections 011 the Rule Against Hearsay, 32 S.C. L. REV. 281 (1980); 
Weinstein, supra note 8; FED. R. Evm. 803(a) (Advisory Comm. Prelim. Proposed Draft 1969), 
reprinted in 2 BAILEY & TRELLES, supra note 14, Doc. 5, at 173. 
45. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 11, at 88 ("[I]t is now part of the lore 
that the [Model] Code failed because lawyers objected to the power left in the trial judge. While 
scholars and appellate court judges may be comfortable with the idea, most practicing lawyers 
are not 'Big Pots' who can count on the trial judge to be benign in his discretion."); House 
Evidence Rules Hearings, supra note 43, at 70 (statement of American College of Trial Lawyers 
opposing broad admissibility of hearsay and condemning increased judicial discretion); id. at 91 
(statement of Washington State Bar Association opposing proposed residual exceptions on 
grounds of increased judicial discretion); id. at 356 (Statement of Colorado Bar Association op-
posing residual exceptions on grounds that they inject too much uncertainty and discretion into 
the law of evidence.); id. at 337 (resolution of American Bar Association House of Delegates). 
46. See, e.g .. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, (1986); Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 
265 (2d Cir. 1952); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1267 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), 
ajfd., 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987). 
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misunderstands the applicable law.47 Free admissibility of unreliable 
evidence gives the jury a peg on which to hang a verdict even if it does 
not believe the unreliable evidence. 
Admitting hearsay can also encourage fabrication. This concern 
about fabrication is often expressed as a concern about misleading the 
jury, but it deserves to be considered in a broader light; its effect upon 
accuracy is not its only effect. Suppose that two cases arise in a juris-
diction that has abolished the hearsay rule. In the first, the jury accu-
rately evaluates all the evidence, and correctly awards judgment to the 
plaintiff on the basis of hearsay evidence. Justice has been done be-
cause the hearsay rule was abolished. In the second case, the jury 
overvalues fabricated hearsay evidence, and as a result incorrectly 
awards judgment for the plaintiff. An analysis of this situation could 
conclude that the injustice perpetrated in the second case is evenly 
balanced by the just result in the first case. Thus, abolition produces 
the same number of just results as enforcement of the hearsay rule, so 
nothing has been lost. But this view disregards the basis for each re-
sult. An incorrect result is more offensive if it is based upon false 
proof than if it is based on failure of proof, and the witnesses who have 
committed perjury are themselves degraded. In short, fabrication is 
wrong even when it does not lead to an inaccurate verdict. 
The hearsay rule has been defended on grounds that it promotes 
economy and speed in litigation.48 Impeachment of a hearsay declar-
ant can be more time-consuming than impeachment of a live witness. 
For example, the live witness may make concessions on cross-exami-
nation that render extrinsic impeachment evidence unnecessary. Of 
course, one can argue that excluding any species of evidence would 
47. Cf Cooper, Directions for Directed Verdicts: A Compass for Federal Courts, 55 MINN. L. 
REV. 903, 930-40 (1971) (raising similar considerations in discussion of dangers of using de· 
meanor evidence as sole basis for surviving directed verdict). 
48. See Weinstein, supra note 8, at 336. Although he favors liberalization of the hearsay rule, 
Weinstein recognizes that exclusion of hearsay arguably promotes speed and economy at trial: 
The second factor [aside from the danger that the jury will misvalue hearsay] is one of trial 
convenience. Where credibility is assessed primarily on the basis of demeanor, an opposing 
attorney can see a witness for the first time and cross-examine solely on the basis of trial 
observation, hints from his client or expert, and what he believes about the witness's back-
ground and the facts of the case. It is better if he is prepared in advance, of course - and all 
the tactics books warn against the danger of unprepared cross-examination. But the trial 
can go on without any extensive before-trial examination of the witness's background or 
preparation for proof and disproof of his credibility by other witnesses and documents. This 
permits cheaper preparation and a shorter trial, and by avoiding the need for continuances 
to permit investigation it makes the present form of dramatic jury trial more practicable. 
See also T. STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 46 (Boston 1826), 
quoted i11 James, supra note 17: 
[S]ince everything would depend upon the character of the party who made the assertion, 
and the means of knowledge which he possessed, the evidence, if admitted, would require 
support from proof of the character and respectability of the asserting party; and every 
question might branch out into an indefinite number of collateral questions. 
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save time, but hearsay seems a particularly good candidate for exclu-
sion because of the other strikes against it. While the matter might be 
handled by invoking the trial judge's discretion to exclude evidence 
that is cumulative or a waste of time, it is not always possible to pre-
dict how much time will be consumed in impeachment, rebuttal, and 
counterattacks by the proponent if the door is opened to a given item 
of hearsay. 
The utility of the hearsay rule as time-saver, however, is uncertain. 
When the rule has the effect of entirely excluding a line of evidence, as 
when the declarant is unavailable, it may save time and money. When 
it operates as a rule of preference, requiring the proponent to call the 
declarant instead of introducing an out-of-court statement, then it may 
have the opposite effect. The declarant must then endure the incon-
venience and vexation of a court appearance. The examination of the 
declarant at trial may take longer than would introduction of an out-
of-court statement incorporated in another witness' testimony, partic-
ularly if the opposing party has no extrinsic impeachment evidence. 
The hearsay rule has also been defended as a protector of the litiga-
tion underdog. Lempert and Saltzburg write that: 
[T]he balance of advantage lies with the state in criminal cases and with 
wealthy' organizations in civil actions. Organizations, unlike most indi-
viduals, usually have substantial resources available for the generation of 
evidence and often have the further advantage that litigation and the 
anticipation of litigation is, for them, routine. This means that organized 
parties are likely to have access to more hearsay evidence than the indi-
viduals they oppose.49 
This generalization may not apply to all cases. The presentation of 
live testimony is often more expensive than the presentation of hear-
say, and allowing litigants to submit affidavits instead of live testimony 
might help the underdog in some cases. However, one can hardly 
quarrel with the position that complete abolition of the hearsay rule 
would fundamentally change the method of preparation for the Amer-
ican trial, and that the changes would advantage some categories of 
litigants - particularly the state in criminal cases - more than 
others. 
A related concern involves the possibility that abolition of the 
hearsay rule would encourage abuse of governmental power in crimi-
nal cases. For example, government investigators would have greater 
49. R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 27, at 521-22 (footnotes omitted). Cf. House 
Evidence Rules Hearings, supra note 43, at 92-93 (statement of Frederick D. McDonald); Rules 
of Evidence: Hearings 011 H.R. 5463 Before the Senate Comm. 011 the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 278 (1974) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (testimony of Professor Paul F. Rothstein), re-
printed i11 4 BAILEY & TRELLES, supra note 14, Doc. 14, at 278. 
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incentive to coerce witnesses or distort statements if out-of-court state-
ments became freely admissible.so This concern about abuse of power, 
which alone might justify distinguishing between the admission of 
hearsay in civil and criminal cases, will be discussed more fully in Part 
III of this article.st 
In a recent article, Professor Charles Nessen suggested still an-
other explanation for the exclusion of hearsay.s2 Professor Nessen re-
jects the conventional rationale for exclusion, stating that jurors are 
capable of assessing the reliability of hearsay evidence and "they 
would undoubtedly be given this task if reliability alone were at 
stake. "s3 He believes that "there must be another, distinct rationale 
for the hearsay rules."s4 He finds that rationale in the enhancement of 
the social acceptability of verdicts by protecting them from subsequent 
attack. After considering and discarding the view that exclusion of 
hearsay enhances the immediate acceptability of verdicts, he decides 
that the hearsay rules "may be grounded on the legal system's concern 
for continuing acceptance of the verdict."ss In his view, hearsay and 
confrontation rules 
prevent jurors from basing a verdict on the statement of an out-of-court 
declarant who might later recant the statement and discredit the verdict. 
Cross-examination of a declarant minimizes the risk that a verdict will 
be undercut by ensuring that the declarant cannot easily recant his state-
ment. During cross-examination, the declarant commits his integrity to 
the accusation; subsequent recantation of the statement would constitute 
an admission of perjury.s6 
A number of objections can be made to this argument. s7 One is 
that the stability of verdicts, if affected by the hearsay rule at all, 
SO. See Rules of Evidence, Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. 011 Reform of Federal 
Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., !st Sess. 244 (1973) [hereinafter 
House Special Subcomm. Hearings] (statement of Frederick D. McDonald), reprinted i11 3 BAI· 
LEY & TRELLES, supra note 14, Doc. 11, at 244; House Evidence Rules Hearings, supra note 43, 
at 92-93 (statements suggesting that power of government investigators would be unduly en· 
hanced by substantive admission of prior inconsistent statements, and that investigators, civil and 
criminal, would be aware of their increased power and less likely to conduct fair investigations); 
Senate Hearings, supra note 49, at 302, 317 (testimony of Herbert Semmel, Washington Council 
of Lawyers). 
,5 I. See text at notes 208-09 infra. 
52. Nesson, supra note 34, at 1372-75. Professor Nesson's article offers helpful insights on 
much broader topics; his discussion of the hearsay rule is merely presented as one example of the 
degree to which the desire to produce acceptable verdicts has influenced the development of legal 
doctrine. 
53. Id. at 1372. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 1373 (emphasis in original). 
56. Id. 
57. See Park, The Hearsay Rule and the Stability of Verdicts: A Response to Professor Nesso11, 
70 MINN. L. REV. 1057 (1986). 
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would seem to be threatened as much by the exclusion as by the ad-
mission of hearsay. When hearsay is excluded, there is a danger that 
declarants whose statements were excluded as hearsay might appear, 
affirm their statements, and offer to testify at a new trial. Their chal-
lenge to the acceptability of the verdict would be more serious than 
that of recanting declarants whose testimony was admitted, because 
their position about the facts would have been completely consistent. 
Whatever one may think of these specific views, however, a certain 
degree of skepticism about the professed reasons for excluding hearsay 
is bound to arise in any thoughtful observer. After reading the legisla-
tive history of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the published articles 
on hearsay reform, one cannot help but be impressed by the degree to 
which the professional status of commentators seems to have influ-
enced their positions on hearsay. Academicians58 and student com-
mentators59 have tended to favor drastic reform leading to much freer 
admission of hearsay (except for those who have written of hearsay as 
an aspect of the constitutional right to confrontation, a context in 
which scholars are more likely to see exclusion as an essential protec-
tion for criminal defendants).60 Judges have tended to favor judicial 
discretion in admitting and excluding hearsay. 61 Prosecutors have sup-
ported receiving more hearsay, citing, among other things, problems 
caused by intimidation of witnesses who have given prior statements. 62 
Bar groups have tended to be procedurally conservative, supporting 
existing exceptions and opposing creation of drastic new ones. 63 
While it is not hard to explain the attitude of judges and prosecutors, 
the reason for the split between bar groups and academicians is less 
obvious. If complicated rules of procedure are motivated by distrust, 64 
then perhaps the answer is that lawyers oppose discretionary hearsay 
rules more than scholars because their trial experience has taught 
58. See note 8 supra. 
59. See, e.g .. Note, supra note 17, at 1804-07; Comment, supra note 19. 
60. See note 8 supra. 
61. This statement must be qualified to some extent, because judicial opinions have often set 
limits upon the admission of hearsay. However, at the hearings on the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, the Judicial Conference of the United States favored supporting the retention of broad 
residual exceptions that would have the effect of conveying substantial discretion. See House 
Evidence Rules Hearings, supra note 43, at 296-97 (statement of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States, Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedure, and on Rules of Evidence). 
62. See, e.g., House Evidence Rules Hearings, supra note 43, at 350-52 (statement of Depart-
ment of Justice); Senate Hearings, supra note 49, at 111-14 (statement of W. Vincent Rakestraw 
on behalf of Department of Justice); id., at 381 (statement of District Attorney, County of Los 
Angeles). Cf M. GRAHAM, supra note 18, at 125-209. 
63. See authorities cited in notes 27, 31, 43 & 45 supra. 
64. See P. CALAMANDREI, PROCEDURE AND DEMOCRACY 83 (1956). 
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them to doubt the impartiality of judges. 65 The lawyer's sense of pro-
fessionalism, of possessing a rare and difficult skill, no doubt plays a 
role as well. The courtroom rituals produced by the rules of evidence 
are hard to learn and cherished once learned; abolition of the hearsay 
rule would make a hard-won element of the trial lawyer's training ob-
solete. It would alter the lawyer's professional life in other ways. 
There would be less opportunity to display forensic skills in cross-ex-
amining witnesses, and trials would lose drama and excitement when 
documentary evidence was received in lieu of live testimony. 
Of course, the possibility that opponents of hearsay reform have 
been motivated by professional status should not preclude us from giv-
ing fair consideration to their explicit rationales in defense of the sta-
tus quo. There are five major themes present in lawyers' arguments 
against hearsay reform. First, the conventional academic rationale for 
excluding hearsay - lack of cross-examination of the declarant - ap-
pears frequently in the discourse of lawyers, and must be counted as a 
major reason for exclusion. Second, concern has frequently been 
voiced about the danger of misreport and fabrication by the in-court 
witness. Third, lawyers have often alluded to the danger of surprise at 
trial. Fourth, lawyers have been concerned that hearsay reform would 
leave admission or exclusion to the uncontrolled discretion of the trial 
judge. Finally, concern has been expressed that the relaxation of hear-
say rules will facilitate abuse of governmental power in criminal cases. 
In Part III of this article, I will argue that these five themes apply 
differently in civil and criminal cases, and that for this reason drastic 
liberalization of the hearsay rules is justified in civil, but not criminal, 
cases. First, however, I tum to the existing structure of the hearsay 
rule itself. 
II. RELATIONSHIP OF JUSTIFICATIONS FOR EXCLUDING HEARSAY 
TO THE STRUCTURE OF THE HEARSAY RULES 
Having outlined the multiple reasons for excluding hearsay by re-
65. Of the attitude of the bar, Morgan wrote: 
[I]t is the disheartening truth that the bar of this country is emphatically antagonistic to any 
measure which involves any expansion of the authority of the trial judge .... There seems to 
be a settled conviction that the average trial bench of the states contains too many judges of 
poor education and unsound judgment, to say nothing of instability of character or plain 
dishonesty. 
E. MORGAN, The Outlook for Reform, in THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 67 (1927). 
For examples of the attitude of scholars who have advocated evidence reform, see Ladd, A 
Modem Code of Evidence, 27 low AL. REV. 213, 219-20 (1942) ("A rational code must be built 
upon the assumption that cases are tried before a trial judge of reasonable ability and highest 
integrity .... ");Morgan, Foreword to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 10 (1942) ("The [Model] 
Code of Evidence ... proceeds upon the theory that it is to be administered by an honest and 
intelligent judge .... "). 
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ferring to statements by lawmakers and commentators, and by draw-
ing inferences from the general effect of exclusion, I will now examine 
specific provisions of the hearsay rule and its exceptions to see what 
light they throw upon reasons for admitting and excluding hearsay. 
Under the untested declarant theory of hearsay exclusion, 66 excep-
tions to the hearsay rule are justified when circumstances reduce the 
danger that the trier will give too much weight to a statement that has 
not been tested by cross-examination. Under this theory, it is the pos-
sible unreliability of the out-of-court statement, not any other consid-
eration, that leads to the exclusion of hearsay. The fact that the 
declarant was not subject to cross-examination (and, secondarily, that 
the declarant was not under oath and subject to observation by the 
trier) makes it difficult to assess the declarant's credibility, so hearsay 
is generally excluded. However, if circumstances surrounding the 
making of the statement provide a guarantee of trustworthiness, then 
the need for cross-examination is reduced and an exception may be 
justified. The case for an exception is bolstered if, in addition, cross-
examination is impossible because the declarant is unavailable, so that 
the choice is between taking the declarant's untested statement or hav-
ing nothing at all. 
Wigmore was a systematic advocate of this view. 67 He wrote that 
"[t]he purpose and reason of the Hearsay rule is the key to the Excep-
tions to it." His theory of the "purpose and reason of" the hearsay 
rule was that "the many possible sources of inaccuracy and untrust-
worthiness which may lie underneath the bare untested assertion of a 
witness can best be brought to light and exposed, if they exist, by the 
test of cross-examination."68 Sometimes, though, hearsay statements 
are so trustworthy that cross-examination would serve little purpose; 
and sometimes cross-examination is impossible, as when the declarant 
is dead. It is then necessary to take the evidence in its "untested 
shape" if it is to be heard at all. These two principles - trustworthi-
ness and necessity - justify the creation of hearsay exceptions, espe-
cially when the two are combined. 69 In his treatment of each 
exception, Wigmore first attempted to show that it was justified by the 
66. See text at notes 21-25 supra. 
67. Wigmore recognized that other theories had influenced lawmakers, but regarded the un-
tested declarant rationale as the key to a true understanding of the hearsay rule. In a section 
devoted to the question whether one reason for excluding hearsay might be the risk that the in-
court witness might inaccurately describe the out-of-court statement, he labeled this justification 
for excluding hearsay as "spurious." 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 1363, at 8. Cf 
id. § 1477, at 288-89 (claiming that limiting to civil cases the exception for statements of fact 
against interest cannot be justified on policy grounds). 
68. Id. § 1420, at 202. 
69. Id. §§ 1420-1422. 
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principles of necessity and trustworthiness. The "trustworthiness" 
that Wigmore was concerned with was the trustworthiness of the de-
clarant's statement, not that of the in-court witness reporting the hear-
say; the in-court witness, after all, was subject to cross-examination. 70 
A more recent example of this approach may be found in a well-
known article by Professor Laurence Tribe.71 To Tribe, hearsay is sus-
pect because the trier must rely upon the credibility of a person whose 
statement has not been made in court, under oath and observation, 
and subject to immediate cross-examination. 72 The exceptions apply 
to situations in which concern about absence of in-court cross-exami-
nation of the declarant is for some reason mitigated. They fall into 
three categories: Group I, where there is an adequate procedural sub-
stitute for in-court cross-examination (e.g., the former testimony ex-
ception); 73 Group II, where the party is deemed to have no right to 
cross-examination (e.g., admissions);74 and Group III, the largest 
group, where "specific attributes of the out-of-court act or utterance 
... are thought to reduce the [credibility] weaknesses so substantially 
that the balance of untrustworthiness and likelihood of probative value 
favors admissibility of the evidence."75 Tribe further classifies the po-
tential weaknesses in credibility as "left-leg" weaknesses (insincerity, 
ambiguity) and "right-leg" weaknesses (poor perception or memory). 
When circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness reduce these de-
clarant credibility weaknesses, a hearsay exception is justified. In fact, 
Tribe declares that "[ o ]ne major unifying theme suggested by the sub-
groups is that, in order to overcome a hearsay objection, one good leg 
is enough. "16 
The exclusive focus of Tribe, Wigmore, and others77 upon the un-
tested declarant theory provides an incomplete picture of the reasons 
for the hearsay exceptions. While concern about the untested declar-
ant has played an important role, the hearsay rules do, and should, 
reflect other concerns. 78 
70. Wigmore recognized that not all of the rules labeled by others as "exceptions" could be 
explained by saying that circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness existed. For that reason, 
he classified admissions not as an exception to the hearsay rule but as an instance in which the 
hearsay rule was inapplicable because the declarant "does not need to cross-examine himself." 4 
WIGMORE (Chadbourn ed.), supra note 8, § 1048, at 4-5 (emphasis omitted). 
71. Tribe, supra note 24. 
72. Id. at 958. 
73. Id. at 961-63. 
74. Id. at 963-64. 
75. Id. at 964-69. 
76. Id. at 966 (emphasis in original). 
77. See, e.g., G. LILLY, supra note 21, at 157-60. 
78. Of course, the influence of a particular consideration may not always have been acknowl· 
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For example, the existence of hearsay exceptions that manifest a 
preference for recorded statements suggests concern about the danger 
of misreport and fabrication by the in-court witness. To be sure, oral 
statements are not excluded categorically by the rule against hearsay, 
but many of the exceptions to the hearsay rule apply only to documen-
tary or other recorded hearsay. 79 Moreover, even when oral state-
ments pass the hurdle of the hearsay rule, they do not necessarily 
become admissible. A variety of other rules, not labeled as hearsay, 
function to create a preference for recorded utterances. Examples in-
clude the parol evidence rule, 80 the statute of frauds, 81 rules requiring 
edged or consciously considered. The hearsay rule and its exceptions have developed over centu-
ries, with each exception taking its own peculiar course. Choices about limiting or expanding an 
exception may have been more palatable to lawyers and judges for reasons that were not recog-
nized or expressed. The absence of an objectionable feature (such as surprise) is not always as 
obvious as its presence, yet that absence may partly explain why some hearsay exceptions have 
been acceptable to lawmakers who otherwise oppose admission of hearsay. 
79. Using the Federal Rules of Evidence as a guide, we find exceptions applicable only to 
recorded statements in rule 803(5) (recorded recollection), rules 803(6) and (7) (business 
records), rule 803(9) (vital statistics), rule 803(10) (absence of public record), rule 803(11) 
(records of religious organizations), rule 803(12) (marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates), 
rule 803(13) (family records), rules 803(14) and (15) (documents affecting an interest in prop-
erty), rule 803(16) (ancient documents), rule 803(17) (published compilations), and rule 803(18) 
(learned treatises). At common law, the public records exception applied only to written hear-
say, see 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 1633, at 623-24, but rule 803(8) refers to 
"statements" as well as "records," and hence could be interpreted to allow the reception of oral 
statements. However, the advisory committee's note contains no indication of intent to broaden 
the exception in this respect, and its reference to "the unlikelihood that [the public official] will 
remember details independently of the record" as a justification for the exception suggests that 
the committee was envisioning recorded hearsay. FED. R. EvID. 803(8) advisory committee's 
note. 
Other exceptions could possibly involve nonrecorded statements but are highly likely to in-
volve statements that at least have recorded counterparts. See FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(l) (former 
testimony), 803(22) (judgments), 803(23) (judgments). 
The rules that display no preference for recorded evidence are 803(1) (present sense impres-
sion), 803(2) (excited utterances), 803(3) (present physical or mental state), 803(4) (statements 
for medical diagnosis or treatment), 804(b)(2) (dying declarations), 804(b)(3) (statements against 
interest), 804(b)(4) (statements of personal or family history). The residual exceptions, rules 
803(24) and 804(b)(5), also contain no express preference for recorded statements, though their 
language is flexible enough to allow recordation to be taken into account in deciding whether to 
receive a statement. 
At times, courts administering exceptions that permit the reception of oral hearsay have im-
posed a preference for documentary hearsay when both documentary and oral statements are 
available. See 5 WJGMORE (Chadbourn ed.), supra note 8, § 1450, at 315-16, and authorities 
cited therein. 
80. Broadly speaking, the parol evidence rule excludes (subject to many exceptions) oral evi-
dence that is offered to vary the terms of a written contract. See C. McCORMICK, supra note 8, 
§§ 210-222, at 426-54. Time and again, evidence and contract writers have insisted that the rule 
is a rule of substantive law, not a rule of evidence. In a characteristically emphatic passage. 
Wigmore wrote that "[f]irst and foremost, the rule is ill no sense a rule of Evidence. but a rule of 
Substantive Law. It does not exclude certain data because they are for one or another reason 
untrustworthy or undesirable means of evidencing some fact to be proved." 9 WIGMORE ON 
EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 2400, at 3 (emphasis in original). Cf. A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CON-
TRACTS 535 (one vol. ed. 1952) (parol evidence rule "is not a rule as to the admissibility of 
testimony"). It seems unlikely, however, that the rule is1completely untarnished by the desire to 
exclude unreliable testimony. While there are other reasons for giving primacy to written agree-
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written testaments, 82 the best evidence rule, 83 and, in some jurisdic-
tions, the dead man's statute. 84 But for these other rules, the hearsay 
rule would no doubt exemplify an even more marked preference for 
recorded statements. 
To some extent, this preference for documentary hearsay can be 
reconciled with the untested declarant rationale. 85 However, the pref-
erence also reflects concern about misreport and fabrication by the in-
court witness. It is harder to forge a document than to fabricate an 
oral statement, and if a document is authentic, there is absolutely no 
danger that the in-court witness will accidentally or intentionally mis-
state the hearsay declarant's utterance. 
The preference for documentary statements probably also reflects a 
concern for unfair surprise at trial. Documentary evidence, or at least 
documentary evidence that is to be introduced as an exhibit in the case 
in chief, is more likely to be discovered by the opponent before trial 
ments, the rule is at least partly based upon the danger that jurors will overvalue testimony about 
oral agreements. As Murray has written, 
[T]here is a tendency to neglect what has been called the procedural function which the rule 
also serves .... In determining whether a writing prevails over an oral expression of agree· 
ment, a jury may fail to adequately consider the relative unreliability of the oral expression. 
The writing is unchanged at the time of trial, but the recollection of the party who is urging 
the choice of the oral agreement is subject to a favorable modification of the actual oral 
expression, and such a modification may occur quite unconsciously. Judges recognized the 
general lack of sophistication in juries when it came to making a choice between the written 
and oral manifestations of agreement. Thus, they reserved to themselves the determination 
of the question of fact involved, to wit, was there really an oral agreement and, if so, did the 
parties intend to abandon it when they expressed themselves in writing? 
J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 228 (1974) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted); 
accord C. McCORMICK, supra note 8, § 210, at 427-29 (jury unlikely to take sufficient account of 
unreliability of witness' memory of oral contract; parol evidence rule protects against "the sym-
pathetic, if not credulous, acceptance by juries of fabricated or wish-born oral agreements."). 
81. Virtually every state has a "statute of frauds" requiring certain types of contracts to be in 
writing. See J. MURRAY, supra note 80, at 640. As the name suggests, the primary purpose of 
the statute of frauds is to prevent fraudulent claims based upon alleged oral agreements. See A. 
CORBIN, supra note 80, at 371-72. 
82. Rules requiring that wills be in writing and that statutory formalities be observed serve 
two functions: a ritual function designed to ensure that the testator has acted deliberately, and 
the function of insuring that evidence of the testator's intent is "cast in reliable and permanent 
form." Gulliver & Tilson, Classificatio11 of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. I, 6 (1941). 
83. In essence, the best evidence rule prohibits oral testimony about the contents of a writing 
unless an adequate excuse has been presented for failure to offer the original. See FED. R. EvID. 
1001-1008. 
84. A "dead man's statute" typically provides that a party may not testify about a communi-
cation with a person since deceased in a suit prosecuted or defended by the decedent's estate. See 
McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 6, at 159. The purpo5e of the statute is to prevent 
fraudulent claims by survivors against estates of persons whose mouths have been closed by 
death. Id. The Federal Rules of Evidence do not contain a dead man's statute, but a number of 
state jurisdictions that have adopted the federal rules have retained their dead man's statutes. 
See Wroth, supra note 6, at 1336-37. 
85. The person who prepares a document may be more careful about what he states, because 
the document will be preserved and may be checked by others. This is true, for example, of 
business records. 
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than oral hearsay.86 If the documentary evidence is to be used for pur-
poses other than presentation in the case in chief, then it is likely that 
it will not be fully admissible as substantive evidence anyways1 and 
possibly the hearsay rule erects this barricade against substantive use 
partly because of fear of surprise. 
Concern about surprise and fabrication may also help explain why 
lawmakers have not created a general exception for statements of un-
available declarants. If the unreliability of the declarant were the only 
concern, lawmakers might have been more willing to say that when 
the declarant is unavailable, hearsay evidence should be admitted for 
what it is worth, since it cannot be replaced by the declarant's in-court 
testimony. However, if perjury by the in-court witness is an independ-
ent concern, then the exclusion of this evidence makes more sense. 
The danger of perjury is increased by the unavailability of the declar-
86. Rule 16(a)(l)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure gives the defendant a right 
to inspect and copy documents that "are material to the preparation of his defense or are in-
tended for use by the government as evidence in chief at the trial, or were obtained from or 
belong to the defendant." Admittedly, rule 16(a)(2) places limits upon the discovery of "internal 
government documents" and statements of government witnesses. Statements of government 
witnesses are not discoverable as a matter of right until after the witness has testified on direct 
examination. Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1982). However, the types of evidence admissible 
under the documentary exceptions to the hearsay rule (e.g., business records) generally would 
not fall within the witness statement protection of the Jencks Act and would be discoverable 
before trial by the defense. If the defense makes a request for discovery under rule 16(a)(l)(C), 
then the government acquires a corresponding right to discover defense documents under rule 
l 6(b )(1 )(A), subject to similar restrictions applicable to internal documents and statements of 
witnesses. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(2). 
In civil cases, parties may inquire about the existence of relevant documents through inter-
rogatories, FED. R. C1v. P. 33, or depositions, FED. R. Civ. P. 30, and may request documents 
from the other party by designating either an item or a "category" of documents. FED. R. C1v. 
P. 34. The rule requires that categories of documents be designated with "reasonable particular-
ity," but generalized designations are often permitted when they do not impose an undue burden 
on the opposing party. See 8 c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 2211 (1970). A party whose request is rejected on grounds that it is insufficiently specific can, 
of course, use other discovery devices to learn more about what documents are available and 
sharpen the request. See United States v. National Steel Corp., 26 F.R.D. 607, 611 (S.D. Tex. 
1960). Documents may be obtained from nonparties by subpoena duces tecum in conjunction 
with a deposition. See FED. R. C1v. P. 45(d)(l). Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
also gives trial judges authority to require lists of documentary exhibits intended to be offered at 
trial. 
Rule 26(b )(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides qualified work product protec-
tion to documents containing witness statements obtained in preparation for litigation, but docu-
ments admissible under the documentary exceptions to the hearsay rule are not ordinarily 
prepared for litigation and hence are discoverable as a matter of course despite rule 26(b )(3). 
87. For example, a document containing a prior inconsistent statement that is used to im-
peach a witness' testimony will ordinarily be admissible only for the light it throws upon the 
witness' credibility, and not for the truth of the matter asserted in the document. See McCOR-
MICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 6, § 251. The Federal Rules do establish a limited category of 
prior inconsistent statements that may be used as substantive evidence, but this category applies 
only to statements made under oath at a "trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition." 
FED. R. Evm. 80l(d)(l)(A). 
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ant. 88 Thus, the hearsay rule may reflect in part the policies that were 
served by the dead man's statutes. 89 (In a well-known but rarely imi-
tated statute creating a broad exception for statements of deceased 
persons, Massachusetts lawmakers included a requirement that the 
judge make a preliminary determination that the out-of-court state-
ment was in fact made, a requirement that suggests fear of perjury by 
the in-court witness.9°) 
The concern about surprise is, of course, also reflected in provi-
sions that require notice of intent to produce hearsay - for example, 
in the residual exceptions to the Federal Rules of Evidence,91 and in 
the comprehensive reform accomplished by the English Civil Evidence 
Act of 1968. 92 Although hearsay scholars have tended to overlook 
surprise prevention as a possible goal of the traditional exceptions, 
codifiers are willing to embrace it as a goal when crafting broad new 
hearsay exceptions. 
The existence of what I will call "transaction exceptions" to the 
hearsay rule probably also reflects concerns about surprise and 
fabrication. By "transaction exceptions" I mean to refer to exceptions 
that admit out-of-court statements that are part of the same general 
transaction or occurrence as independently admissible nonverbal con-
duct. Examples include the present sense impression and excited ut-
terance exceptions (in most of their applications),93 and statements 
88. Cf FED. R. Evm. 803(b)(4) advisory committee's note to original rule (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted): 
The refusal of the common law to concede the adequacy of a penal interest was no doubt 
indefensible in logic, but one senses in the decisions a distrust of evidence of confessions by 
third persons offered to exculpate the accused arising from suspicions of fabrication either of 
the fact of the making of the confession or in its contents, enhanced in either instance by the 
required unavailability of the declarant. 
89. See note 84 supra and accompanying text. 
90. Since 1898, Massachusetts has had a statute making statements of decedents broadly 
admissible in civil actions. The current version of the statute reads as follows: 
In any action or other civil judicial proceeding, a declaration of a deceased person shall not 
be inadmissible in evidence as hearsay ... if the court finds that it was made in good faith 
and upon the personal knowledge of the declarant. 
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 65 (Michie/Law Co-op 1986). Cf R.l. GEN. LAWS§ 9-19-11 
(1985) (making declarations of a deceased person admissible if made in good faith, prior to the 
commencement of the action and with actual knowledge). 
The Massachusetts approach has not spread, though a few states have enacted much more 
limited statutes for cases involving suits by or against the estates of decedents. See 5 WIGMORE 
(Chadbourn ed.), supra note 8, § 1576. 
91. See FED. R. Evm. 803(24), 804(b)(5). 
92. For a description of the British reform, see note 237 infra. 
93. See FED. R. Evm. 803(1), 803(2). The present sense impression exception, which re· 
quires that the statement be made while the declarant was perceiving the event that the statement 
describes or "immediately thereafter," virtually insures temporal and spatial unity between the 
event and the statement. FED. R. Evm. 803(1). The excited utterance exception receives stale· 
men ts made while still under the influence of excitement caused by the event, and hence permits 
a greater lapse of time. See, e.g., Cestero v. Ferrara, 57 N.J. 497, 273 A.2d 761 (1971) (statement 
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that creep in under the nonhearsay rubric of "verbal act" or "verbal 
part of an act. "94 Evidence scholars will recognize these as being part 
of what was once admitted under the vague label "res gestae."95 Now, 
some of these exceptions can be justified on grounds of declarant relia-
bility - the present sense impression exception is an example. 96 The 
excited utterance exception, however, can hardly be defended on this 
ground - indeed, the better view seems to be that excited utterances 
are less reliable than unexcited ones.97 The best reason that the advi-
sory committee, which was wedded to the untested declarant theory, 
could give for retaining the excited utterance exception was that it had 
the sanction of precedent.98 Yet the excited utterance and the other 
"res gestae" utterances have some features that make them easy to 
accept even if they lack indicia of reliability. They are connected with 
the principal transactions that formed the basis for the lawsuit; hence, 
if we use a notice approach to hearsay that mimics "transactional" 
approaches in other procedural contexts (such as relation back of 
amendments)99 where the goal is avoidance of surprise, then the "res 
gestae" exceptions make more sense. When investigating the suit, the 
opponent would be likely to discover information about statements 
by injured person made approximately half an hour after the event causing injury admissible; 
excitement had persisted). Usually, however, excited utterances will be made at the same time 
and place as the event causing the excitement. 
94. Examples of such statements include words accompanying the transfer of money, that 
designate it as a gift, loan, payment, or the like. See McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 6, 
§ 249, at 732-33. These words are legally operative language that should be admissible under the 
traditional untested declarant rationale, since they have value regardless of the declarant's relia-
bility. However, because of the inviting vagueness of the terms "verbal act" and "verbal part of 
an act," some courts have extended their reach to language that, though contemporaneous with 
admissible nonverbal conduct, is not legally operative and involves dangers of declarant unrelia-
bility. See Park, McCormick on Evidence and the Concept of Hearsay, 65 MINN. L. REV. 423, 
441-49 & n.80 and authorities cited therein (1981). 
95. See Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 YALE 
L.J. 229, 238-39 (1922); 6 WIGMORE (Chadbourn ed.), supra note 8, §§ 1766-1768. 
96. The advisory committee's note to rule 803(1) states that the underlying theory of the 
present sense impression exception is that "substantial contemporaneity of event and statement 
negative the likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation." FED. R. Evm. 803(1) ad-
visory committee's note. Contemporaneity also reduces the danger that defects of memory will 
render the assertion unreliable. 
97. See Stewart, supra note 28, at 27-29, and authorities cited therein; Hutchins & Slesinger, 
Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: Spontaneous Exclamations, 28 COL UM. L. REV. 432 
(1928). 
98. The committee wrote that "[w]hile the theory of [the excited utterance exception] has 
been criticized on the ground that excitement impairs accuracy of observation as well as eliminat-
ing conscious fabrication, ... it finds support in cases without number." FED. R. Evm. 803(2) 
advisory committee's note (citations omitted). 
99. See FED. R. C1v. P. 15(c) (amendments relate back to the original pleading when they 
arise "out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the 
original pleading"). See generally Lewis, The Excessive History of Federal Rule 15(c) and Its 
Lessons for Civil Rules Revision, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1507 (1987). 
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that were part of the same transaction or occurrence as the principal 
events that formed the basis for the claim or prosecution. Evidence 
about them would not come as a surprise, and the opponent would be 
armed with witnesses who could explain, rebut, or contradict them, or 
testify that they were fabricated. Also, since "res gestae" statements 
have to occur at the same time and place as other relevant conduct, 
the chance for fabrication by the in-court witness is less; the witness 
does not have freedom to choose a convenient time and place to hear a 
fictional declarant or statement, and therefore the witness' fabrication 
might be exposed by other witnesses or by circumstantial evidence. 100 
The relative absence of dangers of surprise and in-court fabrication 
may also have contributed to the continuing vitality of the dying dec-
laration exception. This exception, like the excited utterance excep-
tion, does not readily admit to modern justification under a declarant 
reliability rationale. Possibly there is something to be said for the idea 
that a dying person will tell the truth. Yet decay in belief in the after-
life has certainly weakened that theory, and modern knowledge about 
perception weakens the idea that the statement, even if made in good 
faith, will be accurate. 101 But the substantive use of the dying declara-
tion does not raise the same problems of fabrication and surprise that 
the substantive use of other victim statements might raise. The lawyer 
in a homicide case knows to look for and expect a dying declaration. 
Moreover, the dying declaration must be given within a certain tempo-
ral and spatial framework, thus limiting the opportunities for 
fabrication by the in-court witness (who cannot always choose a con-
venient time and place to have heard a statement that no one else 
100. The following passage from Professor Morgan suggests that these considerations may 
have influenced courts that applied the "exception" that later was to evolve, with Wigmore's 
help, into the excited utterance exception: 
As in the preceding class [of utterances contemporaneous with independently admissible 
nonverbal acts], the utterance is offered for its truth and is hearsay. Its sole guaranty of 
trustworthiness lies in its spontaneity .... In this country but few cases prior to 1880 gave 
weight directly to the element of spontaneity, and fewer still to the fact that spontaneity was 
insured by the startling nature of the event. Indeed contemporaneousness rather than sponta· 
neity was emphasized, although the latter was clearly recognized as highly important. There· 
after such cases are somewhat more numerous; but it is only since the publication of Dean 
Wigmore's work that this exception to the hearsay rule has gained wide recognition. It is, 
however, by no means universally accepted, and nowhere is the theory of the exception 
applied with logical completeness. If spontaneity of itself is to be accepted as a guaranty of 
trustworthiness, then the subject matter of the declaration should not be limited to the star-
tling event which operated to still the reflective faculties. Yet it is everywhere so limited. 
There is also a marked tendency in many cases to assume that contemporaneousness of 
,utterance and event is a requisite of admissibility, and to argue that it is satisfied where the 
facts show the utterance unreflective, instead of using lapse of time between event and utter-
ance merely as evidence of lack of spontaneity. Likewise there is frequent insistence that the 
utterance be made at the place of the event. 
Morgan, supra note 95, at 238-39 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
101. See Nesson, supra note 34, at 1374 & n.55. 
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heard). Moreover, dangers associated with interrogation methods and 
police influence are reduced by the circumstances. The dying (or ap-
parently dying) person is unlikely to be subjected to the trickery, 
threats, and promises that may occur during station-house 
interrogation. 102 
Another feature of the exceptions for dying declarations and ex-
cited utterances may make them more palatable to those who are con-
cerned about misreport by the in-court witness. Statements that are 
admissible under these exceptions are likely to be short and memora-
ble. Thus, there is less danger of unintentional misreport by the in-
court witness. (Indeed, while there are admittedly exceptions to this 
generalization, 103 the exceptions for oral out-of-court statements apply 
in circumstances in which statements are likely to be brief and sim-
ple, 104 while those for documentary statements permit the introduc-
tion of longer narrative statements filled with hard-to-remember 
figures and details. This difference supplies further evidence that a 
reduction in dangers of misreport often makes hearsay more 
acceptable.) 
Another reason to doubt the validity of reductionist explanations 
for the exclusion of hearsay may be found by considering the rule 
against substantive use of prior inconsistent statements. This rule is 
virtually irrational if one adheres strictly to the untested declarant ra-
tionale - i.e., to the theory that the sole reason for excluding hearsay 
is concern that the declarant's reliability has not been tested by cross-
examination in court. 105 Prior inconsistent statements are admissible 
to impeach the witness, but not for the truth of the matter asserted 
(subject to modern qualifications to be discussed later). 106 This rule 
seems ludicrous under the untested declarant rationale, because the 
declarant is in court and is subject to cross-examination. It has been 
feebly defended on grounds that in-court cross-examination comes too 
late, 107 a point that has been ably refuted.10s 
102. "The narrow subject-matter scope of the [dying declarations] Rule affords built-in safe-
guards against abuse." Senate Hearings, supra note 49, at 70 (Statement of Judicial Conference of 
the United States). 
103. One ex11mple of an exception to this generalization is rule 803(4), statements made for 
medical diagnosis and treatment. These statements may be lengthy and detailed. However, the 
statements are usually made to a member of the medical profession, and professional standards of 
accuracy and the likelihood of contemporaneous recordation reduce the dangers of misreport. 
104. See, e.g., the exceptions created by rules 803(1) (present sense impression), 803(2) (ex-
cited utterances), and 803(3) (then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition). 
105. See, e.g .• McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 6, § 251. 
106. See FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(l)(A); text at notes 111-16 infra. 
107. See State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 362, 285 N.W. 898, 901 (1939), which argues that 
The chief merit of cross-examination is not that at some future time it gives the party oppo-
nent the right to dissect adverse testimony. Its principal virtue is in its immediate applica-
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The prior inconsistent statement rules, if they are not simply arbi-
trary or accidental, must be explained by some justification other than 
the untested declarant rationale. Probably a combination of factors ex-
plain the persistence of these rules. First, the prior inconsistent state-
ment is not a "transactional" statement; the opposing lawyer would 
not necessarily learn of it in the investigation of the nonverbal events 
that give rise to the lawsuit. Nor is it one that the opposing attorney 
would be entitled to discover before trial as a matter of right. 109 Also, 
the in-court witness who wishes to concoct a prior inconsistent state-
ment can pick the time and place at which the purported statement 
was made. Thus, there are dangers of surprise and of fabrication by 
the in-court witness. Moreover, giving substantive effect to the prior 
inconsistent statement would have systemic effects on the criminal jus-
tice system. When investigators obtained a statement from an accom-
plice incriminating a defendant, they would have courtroom evidence, 
not merely an investigative lead. If the accomplice changed his story 
at trial, the statement could be used as substantive evidence of guilt. 
This would put a further premium upon vigorous interrogation of ac-
complices, attempts to extract statements with tricks and with offers of 
immunity or leniency, slanting of statements by statement-takers, and 
outright fabrication. Because of the rule against substantive use, how-
ever, the prior statement may only be used for the lesser purpose of 
impeachment, and sometimes not even for that. 110 
The legislative history of rule 801(d)(l)(A) indicates that concern 
tion of the testing process. Its strokes fall while the iron is hot. False testimony is apt to 
harden and become unyielding to the blows of truth in proportion as the witness has oppor-
tunity for reconsideration and influence by the suggestions of others .... 
108. In response to the argument set forth in the preceding footnote, McCormick wrote: 
Yet the fact in the case was that the witness did change his story very substantially; rather 
than hardening, his testimony yielded to something between the giving of the statement and 
the time of testifying. This appears to be so in a very high proportion of the cases, and the 
circumstances most frequently suggest that the "something" which caused the change was 
an improper influence. 
McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 6, at 745. McCormick also added that the prior state-
ment is likely to be more reliable than the courtroom testimony because it was made nearer to the 
event than the testimony. Finally, the trier does have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of 
the witness. As Judge Learned Hand stated in a much-quoted passage, "If, from nil that the jury 
see of the witness, they conclude that what he says now is not the truth, but what he said before, 
they are none the less deciding from what they see and hear of that person and in court." Di 
Carlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 268 U.S. 706 (1925). See also 3A 
WIGMORE (Chadbourn ed.), supra note 8, § 1018, at 996. 
109. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(l)(A); FED. R. CJV. P. 26(b)(3). 
110. Although the Federal Rules permit anyone, including the party who has called the wit-
ness, to impeach a witness, see FED. R. Evm. 607, the prevailing view is that a prosecutor may 
not call a witness solely to put a prior inconsistent statement before the jury, when the prosecutor 
does not expect to get any helpful courtroom testimony from the witness and when the inconsis-
tent statement is not admissible for substantive purposes under rule 80l(d)(l)(A). See United 
States v. Hogan, 763 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1985), and authorities cited therein. In such a case, the 
prosecutor would merely be hoping that the jury would (improperly) use the statement for the 
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about fabrication by investigators and systemic criminal justice con-
cerns played as much a role in limiting the use of prior inconsistent 
statements as did the orthodox concern about immediate cross-exami-
nation of the declarant. The version of the rule proposed by the advi-
sory committee and transmitted by the Supreme Court to Congress 
would have permitted the substantive use of any prior inconsistent 
statement. 111 Opponents of the rule argued that the liberalization 
would give too much power to investigators, and would encourage 
fabrication and other misconduct. 112 Influenced by the danger of 
fabrication by in-court witnesses, 113 the House amended the bill so 
that it gave substantive effect only to inconsistent statements given 
under oath, subject to cross-examination, at a trial or hearing or in a 
deposition. 114 After further revision later in the legislative process, the 
rule's cross-examination requirement was dropped. In its final form, 
the rule permits the substantive use of prior inconsistent statements 
that were "given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, 
truth of what it asserts, and hence the statement should be excluded as prejudicial under rule 
403. FED. R. Evm. 403. 
111. FED. R. Evm. 80l(d)(l)(A) (Supreme Court Proposed Draft 1973), reprinted in 2 BAI-
LEY & TRELLES, supra note 14, Doc. 7, at 27. 
112. This concern is reflected in the reasons that the House Committee on the Judiciary gave 
for amending the prior inconsistent statement rule. See note 113 infra. See also House Special 
Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 50, at 244 (statement of Frederick D. McDonald); House Evi-
dence Rules Hearings, supra note 43, at 92-93 (statement of Frederick D. McDonald). McDon-
ald argued thar if prior inconsistent statements were admissible for substantive purposes, "[t]he 
power of investigators will be unduly enhanced." Id. When an investigator takes a statement, 
McDonald noted, he will have created admissible evidence even if the witness later makes an 
inconsistent statement. This power is subject to abuse. An investigator represents only one side, 
and hence will overlook or fail to uncover facts favorable to the other side. Also, "[t]he proposed 
rule will place excessive power in the hands of governmental agencies and other organizations 
whose work includes court use. The rule will tip the scales of justice much more toward agen-
cies, organizations and those few individuals who can afford-investigators and away from the less 
affiuent." Id. He also stated that 
The [proposed] rule [making prior inconsistent statements admissible for substantive pur-
poses] means that investigators, government and otherwise, can - out of court, and out of 
the presence of anyone - take a statement from anyone and that statement, even be it 
unsworn, becomes substantive evidence to prove the case if the witness later varies from it. 
It will make it possible for investigators to create airtight cases long before trial or 
indictment. 
House Special Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 50, at 244. See also Senate Hearings, supra note 
49, at 302 (statement of Herbert Semmel, Washington Council of Lawyers). Cf State v. 
Spadafore, 220 S.E.2d 655, 664 (W. Va. 1975). 
113. See H.R. REP. No. 650, supra note 43, at 13. This report gave two reasons for the 
Committee's proposed compromise version of the prior inconsistent statement rule: 
(I) unlike in most other situations involving unsworn or oral statements. there can be no 
dispute as to whether the prior statement was made; and (2) the context of a formal proceed-
ing, an oath, and the opportunity for cross-examination provide firm additional assurances 
of the reliability of the prior statement. 
Id. (emphasis added). The second reason, insofar as it refers to cross-examination, does not 
apply to the final version of rule 80l(d)(l)(A), but the first reason is still fully applicable. 
114. See M. GRAHAM, supra note 18, at 138-39. 
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hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition." 115 This rule permits 
substantive use of grand jury testimony, which need not be under 
cross-examination. The best explanation for permitting this use of 
grand jury testimony, while precluding substantive use of informal 
witness statements, is not that grand jury witnesses are trustworthy, 
but that witness testimony in a grand jury proceeding is likely to be 
accurately recorded and will not be fabricated by the in-court wit-
ness.116 To some degree, the testimony is also insulated from the dan-
gers of station-house interrogation, and hence its acceptability is 
enhanced by the fact that it does not raise the same degree of concern 
about abuse of power by interrogators as does the reception of infor-
mal witness statements. 
The admissions exception - or exemption117 - is also difficult to 
explain under the untested declarant thesis. 118 Under that thesis, ex-
ceptions to the hearsay rule are justified when circumstantial guaran-
tees of trustworthiness compensate for the absence of cross-
examination. Yet admissions are not required to be trustworthy. An 
admission need not have been against interest or have any other indi-
cia of reliability.119 Commentators have noted this anomaly, and have 
tended to treat the admissions exception as sui generis. The advisory 
committee, noting that "[n]o guarantee of trustworthiness is required 
in the case of an admission," stated that "[its] admissibility in evidence 
is the result of the adversary system rather than satisfaction of the 
conditions of the hearsay rule." 120 Other commentators have said that 
the exception is based upon the notion that a party cannot complain 
about the party's own unreliability, 121 or that admissions are received 
115. FED. R. Evm. 80l(d)(l)(A). 
116. See note 113 supra and accompanying text. 
117. Following Wigmore, the advisory committee decided to classify admissions as nonhear-
say, instead of classifying them as hearsay admissible under an exception. The committee rea· 
soned that "[a]dmissions by a party-opponent are excluded from the category of hearsay on the 
theory that their admissibility in evidence is the result of the adversary system rather than satis-
faction of the conditions of the hearsay rule." FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(2) advisory committee's 
note. 
118. For a more extended treatment of this topic, see R. PARK, THE RATIONALE OF PER· 
SONAL ADMISSIONS (forthcoming). 
119. See FED. R. Evm. 80l(d)(2) advisory committee's note (commenting that "[n]o guaran· 
tee of trustworthiness is required in the case of an admission"). See also Morgan, Admissions, 12 
WASH. L. REV. 181, 182 (1937); 4 WIGMORE (Chadbourn ed.), supra note 8, § 1048. 
120. FED. R. Evm. 80l(d)(2) advisory committee's note. 
121. See E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 266 (1962); c. McCORMICK, supra 
note 8, § 239, at 503 ("This notion that it does not lie in the opponent's mouth to question the 
trustworthiness of his own declarations is an expression of feeling rather than logic but it is an 
emotion so universal that it may stand for a reason."). 
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as a judicial punishment for inconsistency. 122 
The assertion that admissions are received as a "result of the ad-
versary system" does not, standing alone, justify anything. It amounts 
to nothing more than saying "that's the way the system operates."123 
The other theories, which are based upon the idea that "you said it 
and you're stuck with it," do help explain why the exception is emo-
tionally appealing. It seems likely, however, that the exception has 
maintained its remarkable appeal partly for other reasons, which in-
clude the relative absence of problems of surprise, discretion, and 
abuse of governmental power. Ordinarily, the party against whom an 
admission is offered will not be surprised by it because the statement 
came from the party's own mouth. By questioning the client, the law-
yer should be able to learn of the admission and prepare to rebut or 
explain it. Even the totally fabricated admission should not be a sur-
prise to a diligent lawyer; the lawyer would routinely be entitled to 
know about alleged admissions of the client through discovery, even in 
criminal cases. 124 Moreover, the rule receiving personal admissions 
raises no problems of judicial discretion. It is clear and categorical. 
Finally, the concern in criminal cases that reception of hearsay evi-
dence may lead to abuse of government power has been mitigated by 
the operation of doctrines other than the hearsay rule. When an ad-
mission is offered against the defendant in a criminal case, fifth amend-
ment rules governing confessions serve to regulate the conduct of 
statement-takers and protect against the reception of evidence created 
by government coercion.12s 
A related "exception" to the hearsay rule is one that James McEl-
haney, in a humorous treatment of courtroom oddities, has called the 
"Cleveland Exception."126 Under the "Cleveland Exception," any-
122. See Lev, The Law of Vicarious Admissions -An Estoppel, 26 U. C1N. L. REV. 17, 29 
(1957). 
123. Bein, Parties' Admissions, Agents' Admissions: Hearsay Wolves in Sheep's Clothing, 12 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 393, 419 (1984). 
124. Rule 16(a)(l)(A) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure gives the defendant the 
right, on discovery, to a copy of any written or recorded statement made by the defendant, and to 
"the substance of any oral statement [by the defendant] which the government intends to offer in 
evidence .... " In civil cases, statements by a party are freely discoverable by the party who 
made them through interrogatories and requests for documents. The work product doctrine does 
not require a showing of special need for the discovery of the party's own statement. See FED. R. 
C1v. P. 26(b)(3). 
125. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (accused must be informed of rights 
to counsel and to refuse to answer questions); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (reception 
of involuntary confessions violates due process). In applying these constitutional safeguards, the 
courts have not distinguished between admissions that are confessions (statements directly con-
ceding that the defendant committed the crime) and other admissions offered by the prosecution. 
See 2 c. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL§ 413 (1982). 
126. McElhaney, The Cleveland Exception to the Hearsay Rule and Other Courtroom Oddi-
82 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 86:51 
thing said in the defendant's presence is admissible against the defend-
ant.127 This is, of course, a rule of thumb and not formal hearsay 
doctrine. The presence of the defendant may be relevant to admissibil-
ity (for example, the presence of the defendant is necessary if a state-
ment is being offered as an adoptive admission), but the presence of 
the defendant is not conclusive. For example, if the defendant is ac-
cused of a bad act and denies the accusation, then the statement is not 
admissible. Yet the persistence of the notion among some trial lawyers 
that whatever is said in the presence of the defendant is admissible 
suggests an intuitive feeling that it is fair to admit such statements. 
The defendant has been put on notice of the accusation or other state-
ment and can take the stand to rebut or explain it. Without defending 
the purported "rule," I offer its remarkable courtroom vitality as evi-
dence that notice and absence of surprise are considered, consciously 
or not, to be significant factors favoring the admission of hearsay. 
Further evidence of multiple reasons for exclusion may be found in 
the law regarding declarations against penal interest. The concern 
about fabrication by the in-court witness explains, in part, the long 
judicial reluctance to accept declarations against penal interest as an 
exception to the hearsay rule. At common law, statements against pe-
cuniary or proprietary interest were admissible if the declarant was 
unavailable; statements against penal interest were not. Thus, the ut-
terances "I gave away my tiara to my oldest daughter" or "I owe Han-
son $500" were admissible under the exception, but "I am the Boston 
strangler" was not (although of course it could come in as the admis-
sion of a party-opponent when the declarant was a party). This result 
seems at first anomalous under the untested declarant rationale, since 
a concession that the declarant committed a crime would usually sub-
ject the declarant to greater danger than a declaration against financial 
interest, and therefore would not likely be said unless it was true. 
In fact, however, the circumstances under which penal interest 
statements were made often gave rise to doubts about both the sincer-
ity of the declarant and the truthfulness of the in-court witness. The 
statement against penal interest often became crucial when it was of-
fered by the defendant as the confession of a third person to the crime 
with which the defendant was charged. The third person might be 
ties, I REV. LITIGATION 93, I 12-13 (1980). Cf McDaniels, Rule 801: More Tira// a Defi11itio11, 
LITIGATION, Fall 1975, at 17 (referring to the same rule as the "Philadelphia Exception"), 
127. See, e.g., Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 366 (2d Cir. 1925) (Hand, J.) ("It is n 
common error to suppose that everything said in the presence of n defendant is ipso facto admis-
sible against him."). For evidence that this rule of thumb has overseas adherents, see Strachan, 
Hearsay - Statements Made Before Defendant, 120 NEW L.J. I 185, I 185-86 (1970) (com-
plaining about automatic admission of such statements in English magistrates' courts). 
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unavailable, and there might be great doubt about whether the state-
ment was made, whether it was made voluntarily, and if made volun-
tarily, whether it was true. Courts were reluctant to admit these 
statements because of doubts about both the declarant and the in-
court witness. McCormick ascribed judicial reluctance to accept the 
statements to "fear of opening a door to a flood of witnesses testifying 
falsely to confessions that were never made .... " 128 Wigmore recog-
nized that "[t]he only plausible reason of policy that has ever been 
advanced for such a limitation [excluding statements against penal in-
terest from the exception for declarations against interest] is the possi-
bility of procuring fabricated testimony to such an admission if oral." 
Typically, he condemned this justification, which does not fit his un-
tested declarant theory, saying that 
This is the ancient rusty weapon that has always been brandished to 
oppose any reform in the rules of evidence, viz., the argument of danger 
of abuse. This would be a good argument against admitting any wit-
nesses at all, for it is notorious that some witnesses will lie and that it is 
difficult to avoid being deceived by their lies. The truth is that any rule 
which hampers an honest man in exonerating himself is a bad rule, even 
if it also hampers a villain in falsely passing for an innocent. 129 
The Revised Draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence submitted to 
the Supreme Court by the advisory committee in 1971 contained an 
exception that would have received declarations against penal interest 
freely, even when used to exonerate the accused. 130 The advisory com-
mittee recognized that the decisional law manifested a distrust of evi-
dence of confessions by third parties "arising from suspicions of 
fabrication either of the fact of the making of the confession or in its 
contents, enhanced in either instance by the required unavailability of 
the declarant." 131 However, it expressed the view that questions of 
fabrication should be "trusted to the competence of juries."132 After 
receiving comments from Senator McClellan criticizing this rule, the 
Supreme Court added a provision that "[a] statement tending to excul-
pate the accused is not admissible unless corroborated."133 
The advisory committee revised its note to reflect the change. It 
noted again the concern about fabrication "either of the fact of the 
128. McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 6, at 823. 
129. 5 WlGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 1477, at 358-59 (footnote omitted). 
130. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(4) (Supreme Court Proposed Draft 1973), reprinted in 2 BAILEY 
& TRELLES, supra note 14, Doc. 6. 
131. See FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(4) advisory committee's note to proposed rule, reprillted in 2 
BAILEY & TRELLES, supra note 14, Doc. 6 (emphasis added). 
132. Id. 
133. See 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE f;f; 804-12, 804-140 
(1985). 
84 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 86:51 
making of the confession or in its contents" but maintained that penal 
interest statements often have the required degree of trustworthiness. 
It concluded by stating that the corroboration requirement had been 
added to "effect an accommodation between these competing consid-
erations." 134 Subsequently the House Judiciary Committee proposed 
an amendment to the rule that would require that an exonerating con-
fession be "clearly" corroborated, expressing a concern that otherwise 
the defendant's testimony alone would be enough to corroborate the 
statement. 135 The amendment was accepted by Congress and is con-
tained in the present rule. 
This treatment of declarations against penal interest in criminal 
cases reflects concern for fabrication both by the in-court witness and 
by the out-of-court declarant, and a distrust of the jury's ability to 
detect this fabrication. In civil cases, by contrast, declarations against 
penal interest are freely admissible without any requirement of corrob-
oration. This rule does in this context what I will later argue should 
be done generally: it creates a distinction between civil and criminal 
cases, based upon the different institutional considerations and the dif-
ferences in the type of judgment the trier is required to make. 
Throughout this section, I have tried to illustrate that the untested 
declarant theory is an incomplete explanation of the structure of the 
hearsay rules. It must be conceded, however, that the untested declar-
ant theory has been a powerful force in shaping the hearsay rules. The 
theory explains the absence of any restriction on the admission of 
statements that are not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. 136 
The fact that they are admitted freely suggests that once concerns 
about the reliability of the declarant are removed, 137 other concerns 
are not strong enough to bar admission. This inference from the ad-
mission of statements not offered for their truth is strongest if we focus 
solely upon rules labeled by current doctrine as "hearsay" and ignore 
other rules governing the admission of out-of-court statements. Con-
cededly the predominant concern of the hearsay rules is the reliability 
of the out-of-court declarant; though important, problems with the in-
court witness are secondary considerations. However, if we look gen-
134. FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(3) advisory committee's note. 
135. H.R. REP. No. 650, supra note 43, at 16. 
136. Under the conventional definition, a statement is not hearsay if it is not offered to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted. See. e.g., FED. R. Evm. SOl(c). 
137. Generally, when statements are not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, they do 
not depend for value on the credibility of the declarant, and hence there is no reason for concern 
about the declarant's reliability. For examples of special situations in which a statement not 
offered for the truth of the matter asserted will depend to some degree upon the declarant's 
credibility, see Park, supra note 94, at 426-35. 
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erally to rules about the reception of out-of-court verbal utterances, 
then we find a good deal of concern about the in-court witness. The 
best evidence rule, for example, is a rule of preference based upon the 
idea that the in-court witness may mistakenly transmit the contents of 
a document or other recorded utterance. 138 In jurisdictions where 
they survive, the dead man's statutes reflect concern about fabrication 
of out-of-court statements.139 "Substantive" rules about the formalities 
required for contracts, wills, and other legal acts are partly based upon 
the idea that ritual informs judgment, and partly upon the idea that 
oral utterances may be fabricated or erroneously reported. 140 The 
statute of frauds is expressly aimed at fabricated utterances. 141 Were it 
not for these other rules governing the admissibility of out-of-court 
verbal utterances, the hearsay rule would most likely reflect concerns 
of mistake and fabrication in these areas. Of course, there is nothing 
inherently wrong with doctrinal classification, if it could be done, of 
evidence rules into those concerned with the untested declarant (hear-
say rules) and those concerned with the flawed in-court witness (best 
evidence rule, dead man's statute, statute of frauds, etc.). Perhaps 
doctrinal purity would be served by systematically restricting the hear-
say rule to situations in which a single concern (the untested declar-
ant) justifies exclusion. Yet this division in principle is a difficult one 
to maintain in application, since multiple concerns often converge in 
the context of a single type of statement - such as the confession of a 
third party offered to exonerate the defendant in a criminal case. 
Thus, when exclusion of a statement is based in any degree upon con-
cerns about the reliability of the out-of-court declarant, it is conve-
nient to classify that type of statement as "hearsay" and to modify the 
structure of the rule to reflect additional concerns about witness 
fabrication. 
In this Part, I have attempted to describe how the structure of the 
hearsay rule is consistent not only with the untested declarant ration-
ale, but also with concerns about surprise and witness unreliability. 
The fourth concern listed in Part I, the concern about judicial discre-
tion, also permeates the structure of the hearsay rules. The retention 
of class exceptions, in lieu of adoption of a single broad rule (e.g., that 
reliable hearsay is admissible), is largely attributable to concern about 
judicial discretion. The class exceptions limit judicial discretion to ex-
clude hearsay by setting forth specific categories that are not pro-
138. See FED. R. Evm. 1001-1008 and corresponding advisory committee's notes. 
139. See note 84 supra. 
140. See notes 80-82 supra and accompanying text. 
141. See note 81 supra. 
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scribed by the hearsay ban. They also limit discretion to admit 
hearsay - either by setting forth specific rules of exclusion, as in the 
case of police records, 142 or by restricting the scope of the residual 
exceptions by negative implication.143 Moreover, the conditions with 
which Congress hedged the residual exceptions were intended to limit 
the discretion of judges to receive hearsay that does not fall under con-
ventional exceptions. 144 
Finally, the structure of the rules excluding hearsay reflects a de-
gree of appreciation of the need for greater protection in criminal 
cases. As briefly noted above, some exceptions contain express distinc-
tions between civil and criminal cases. One of the most important of 
these is the public records exception, which became a subject of con-
troversy in Congress because it initially failed to provide adequate pro-
tection for defendants in criminal cases. Originally, the Supreme 
Court transmitted a public records rule recommended by the advisory 
committee that would have permitted the firsthand observations of po-
lice officers to be proven by their police reports, though it would have 
forbidden the use of public-record "factual findings" by the govern-
ment in criminal cases. 145 The Federal Rules were amended on the 
floor of the House to prohibit as well the reception "in criminal cases 
[of] matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement 
personnel."146 
142. See text at notes 145-46 infra. 
143. One can infer by negative implication that hearsay failing to fit a class exception 
designed to cover the situation presented should also be excluded when offered under the residual 
exceptions. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190, 1262-64 
(E.D. Pa. 1980), revd. on other grounds sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 
F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), revd. on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1955 
(1987); Sonenshein, The Residual Exceptions to the Federal Hearsay Rule: Two Exceptions i11 
Search of a Rule, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 867, 885-88 (1982). 
144. See, e.g .• REPORT OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, s. REP. No. 1277, 93d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 18-20 (1974), repri11ted ill 1974, U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7051, 7065-
66. 
145. See FED. R. Evm. 803(8) (Advisory Comm. Revised Draft 1971), reprillled i11 2 BAILEY 
& TRELLES, supra note 14, Doc. 6, at 106; FED. R. Evm. 803(8) (Supreme Court Proposed Drafl 
1973), repri111ed'in 2 BAILEY & TRELLES, supra note 14, Doc. 7, at 29. 
146. FED. R. Evm. 803(8)(B). See 120 CONG. REC. H2387-89 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974). The 
bill's legislative history indicates that the representatives who offered the House amendment were 
concerned about the lack of cross-examination of the absent police officer. See id. at 2387 (re-
marks of Representatives Holtzman and Dennis), reprillled i11 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 
FOR UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES 134 (West 1984). Opponents of the amend-
ment objected that police officers were just as reliable as other public servants. See 120 CONG. 
REC., supra, at 2388 (remarks of Rep. Smith), repri111ed ill FEDERAL RUl.ES OF EVIDENCE FOR 
UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES 135 (West 1984). The Report of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary characterized the basis for the House amendment as being "that observa-
tions by police officers at the scene of the crime or the apprehension of the defendant are not as 
reliable as observations by public officials in other cases because of the adversarial nature of the 
confrontation between the police and the defendant in criminal cases." S. REP. No. 1277, supra 
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The Federal Rules also distinguish between civil and criminal cases 
in their treatment of declarations against interest, 147 judgments of pre-
vious conviction, 148 dying declarations, 149 and former testimony. 1so 
Like the public records exception, these exceptions are uniformly 
more liberal in receiving hearsay evidence in civil cases than in crimi-
nal cases. Moreover, whatever the specific content of the hearsay rules, 
the judicial attitude toward exclusion appears to be stricter in criminal 
cases. Admission of hearsay is more frequently found to be reversible 
error in criminal cases, indicating that for practical purposes the de-
gree of discretion accorded trial judges is less than in civil cases. 1s1 
Special concerns about criminal cases have also played a role in the 
shaping of hearsay rules that do not make an express distinction be-
tween civil and criminal cases. One such rule has already been dis-
cussed: the provision allowing limited substantive use of prior 
inconsistent statements. The Court's proposed version of the rule 
would have allowed unlimited substantive use of these statements, and 
Congress' decision to limit the exception was apparently based upon 
concerns about its effect in criminal cases. 1s2 
In short, the structure of the hearsay rules, as supplemented by 
other rules excluding out-of-court statements, reflects all of the con-
cerns enumerated in Part I of this article. The development of rules 
excluding out-of-court statements has been influenced not only by con-
cerns about the untested declarant, but also by concerns about witness 
note 144, at 17, reprillted in FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS AND 
MAGISTRATES 137 (West 1984). 
147. See FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(3) (even if it meets the other requirements of a statement 
against interest, a statement "tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to 
exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the 
trustworthiness of the statement"). 
148. Rule 803(22) excludes judgments against persons other than the accused when they are 
offered by the government in a criminal proceeding for purposes other than impeachment. This 
provision is a codification of Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899) (in prosecution for 
possessing stolen postage stamps, confrontation clause prohibits introduction of conviction of 
another for purposes of proving that the stamps were stolen). 
149. FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(2) permits dying declarations to be used in civil cases, but limits 
their use in criminal cases to prosecutions for homicide. 
150. In criminal cases, the former testimony exception applies only ifthe party against whom 
the testimony is now offered had motivations and opportunities in a prior action similar to those 
in the present action to offer the testimony; in civil cases, it also applies if a predecessor in 
interest had such motivations and opportunities in a prior action. FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(l). 
151. See J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 133, c; 800[03], at 800-18. Among the 
reasons mentioned by Weinstein and Berger for this different attitude are the greater chance of 
prejudice, the influence of the right to confrontation, the limits on the use of extrajudicial state-
ments of accused imposed by the privilege against incrimination and the right to counsel, and the 
more limited discovery in criminal cases. Id. Elsewhere, Weinstein and Berger mention .. the 
frequent in-custody status of witnesses" as a reason for being more chary of hearsay in criminal 
cases than in civil cases. Id. ~ 800[04], at 800-19. 
152. See text at notes 111-16 supra. 
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fabrication, the danger of surprise, problems raised by judicial discre-
tion, and the effect of reception of hearsay upon the criminal justice 
system. In the next section, I will argue that these concerns justify a 
more broadly-based distinction between civil and criminal cases. 
III. A SUBJECT MA TIER APPROACH TO HEARSAY REFORM 
A. Reasons for a Subject Matter Approach 
In this Part of the article, I will argue that hearsay reform should 
be approached by subject matter, and that civil and criminal cases 
should be treated differently. I will describe the different considera-
tions raised by admission of hearsay in civil and criminal cases, and 
propose changes in the Federal Rules of Evidence to take account of 
differences in the two types of cases. 
1. Hearsay and the Confrontation Clause 
One reason to treat criminal and civil cases differently is that con-
frontation clause precedent impedes drastic liberalization of the hear-
say rules in criminal cases. Any legislative attempt, at either the state 
or federal level, to make radical changes would invite appellate court 
litigation defining the extent to which evidence now excluded by hear-
say doctrine must be excluded under the confrontation clause. The 
benefits of codification would be lost. While the confrontation clause 
could be reinterpreted to clear the way for drastic changes, that pro-
cess would require an extended period of litigation and the overruling 
of a substantial body of Supreme Court precedent. 
The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment provides that "In 
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him." 153 The language of the 
amendment does not provide clear guidance about hearsay issues. It is 
susceptible to a variety of plausible textual interpretations. Under one 
interpretation, all hearsay declarants whose statements are offered by 
the prosecution would be considered "witnesses against" the defen-
dant, and therefore the Constitution would require that the defendant 
be confronted by them at trial. This interpretation would lead to the 
exclusion of all hearsay, even hearsay that fell under an exception es-
tablished at the time of the adoption of the amendment. Alternatively, 
one could interpret the amendment to require merely that the defen-
dant be confronted with whatever witnesses the prosecution chose to 
produce at trial. Under this interpretation, trial witnesses could testify 
153. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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about hearsay declarations, and the confrontation clause would im-
pose no limits upon the creation of new hearsay exceptions. It would 
merely require the presence of the defendant when evidence was 
presented to the trier of fact. 154 The amendment could also be con-
strued so that "witnesses against" the defendant referred only to per-
sons who were available to testify. Under this interpretation, the 
prosecution would be required to produce declarants for cross-exami-
nation when possible, but the statements of una¥ailable declarants 
could be freely admitted.155 
The historical background of the amendment does not provide 
clear guidance in choosing between these or other interpretations. As 
Justice Harlan suggested, the confrontation clause "comes to us on 
faded parchment."156 The confrontation clause was included in the 
Bill of Rights without congressional debate about its meaning, 157 and 
speculation about the scope of the clause has centered upon the legal 
and political climate at the time rather than upon statements made in 
debate. 158 One tradition holds that the clause was a reaction to the 
abuses that occurred at the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh in 1603.159 Un-
fortunately, even if Raleigh's trial did have a major impact upon the 
154. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 94 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); 5 W1GMORE ON 
EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 1397, at 131, 134 (confrontation clause should be construed so that it 
merely requires cross·examination of witnesses who are required to testify in court by the hearsay 
rules in effect at the time of trial; nothing in the clause should be construed to inhibit revision and 
extension of hearsay exceptions). 
155. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Westen, 
supra note 8, at 1188-89; Younger, Confrontation and Hearsay: A Look Backward, a Peek For-
ward, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 32 (1973). 
156. Green, 399 U.S. at 174 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan's historical inquiry led 
him to the following conclusion: ' 
From the scant information available it may tentatively be concluded that the Confrontation 
Clause was meant to constitutionalize a barrier against flagrant abuses, trials by anonymous 
accusers, and absentee witnesses. That the Clause was intended to ordain common law rules 
of evidence with constitutional sanctions is doubtful, notwithstanding English decisions that 
equate confrontation and hearsay. Rather, having established a broad principle, it is far 
more likely that the Framers anticipated it would be supplemented, as a matter of judge-
made common law, by prevailing rules of evidence. 
399 U.S. at 179. 
157. Justice Harlan noted that "[i]t is common ground that the historical understanding of 
the clause furnishes no solid guide to adjudication." Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95 (1970) 
(Harlan, J., concurring). See also Green, 399 U.S. at 176 & n.8 (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 
(1789-1790)) (Justice Harlan noted "the prevailing view" that "the usual primary sources and 
digests of the early debates contain no informative material on the confrontation right."). 
158. In support of his position in Green that the confrontation clause excludes only the testi-
mony of available witnesses, Justice Harlan found a "glimmer" of illumination in a brief state-
ment made during the debate on the sixth amendment's companion provision giving the 
defendant the right to compulsory process. The glimmer is, however, a very faint one. See 
Green, 399 U.S. at 177 (quoting statement in debate indicating that the compulsory process 
clause was understood by one debater as requiring only that defendant be able to compel the 
attendance of witnesses who are available at the scheduled time of trial). 
159. See, e.g., F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 106-07 (1951). 
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framers of the amendment, it provides little guidance about the scope 
of the amendment in cases of less flagrant abuse. If the amendment 
was intended to prohibit the type of conduct that took place at Ra-
leigh's trial, all that we know is that patently unreliable accusations 
made by an accomplice while in custody should not be admitted (at 
least when the accomplice is readily available for testimony), 160 and 
perhaps that anonymous rumors from declarants without personal 
knowledge should be excluded as well. 161 The hearsay rule could be 
radically revamped without infringing upon the principle that such 
testimony must be excluded. Of course, the fact that the framers to 
some extent may have had Raleigh's tdal in mind does not mean that 
they intended to prohibit only the specific abuses that occurred at that 
trial. 
Other historical evidence suggests that the framers may have been 
reacting to a more recent event: the use of vice-admiralty courts by 
the Crown to prosecute colonists for trade offenses. 162 The vice-admi-
ralty courts were criticized by colonial leaders for substituting civil 
law procedure for the common-law adversarial system. The right to 
confront witnesses was possibly intended to protect against perceived 
abuses of these courts, including the practice of examining witnesses in 
closed chambers. Again, this hypothesis does not provide clear gui-
dance to contemporary interpretation of the confrontation clause: the 
framers may have intended to protect only the essentials of common-
law adversarial procedure, without necessarily preventing hearsay 
from being introduced under evolving exceptions. t63 
In an illuminating recent article, Professor Lilly advanced the 
"tentative hypothesis" that the clause may have done more: it may 
160. Raleigh was accused of treason against Queen Elizabeth. The principal evidence again5t 
him was the statement of Lord Cobham, an alleged coconspirator, who had incriminated Raleigh 
in a sworn statement made before trial. Cobham himself was in custody. Raleigh unsucce55fully 
demanded that Cobham be produced for live testimony, claiming that "he is in the house hard 
by, and may soon be brought hither." J. PHJLLIMORE, HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW 
OF EVIDENCE 158 (1850). 
161. The evidence against Raleigh also included testimony by one Dyer, a pilot, who te5lified 
that 
Being at Lisbon, there came to me a Portugal gentleman, who asked me how the King of 
England did, and whether he was crowned? I answered him, that I hoped our noble King 
was well, and crowned by this; but the time was not come when I came from the coast of 
Spain. "Nay," said he, "your King shall never be crowned, for Don Cobham and Don 
Raleigh will cut his throat before he come to be crowned." 
Id. at 162. To this Raleigh replied, "This is the saying of some wild Jesuit or beggarly priest: but 
what proof is it against me?" Id. 
162. See Lilly, Notes on the Confrontation Clause and Ohio v. Roberts, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 
207, 210-12 (1984); Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Ra-
leigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 104 n.23 (1972). 
163. See Lilly, supra note 162, at 211-12. 
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have given constitutional status to contemporaneous common-law 
doctrine excluding hearsay statements of available declarants. 164 Cer-
tainly this is one plausible interpretation of the historical record, 
though hardly a conclusive one. It rests not on the expressed intent of 
the framers, but upon the existence of common-law doctrine of which 
they might have been aware, and which they might have intended to 
constitutionalize. As Professor Lilly recognizes, the historical record is 
hardly conclusive, and could even be interpreted to support Wig-
more's thesis that the confrontation clause does not apply when hear-
say is received under an exception recognized by the rules of evidence 
in effect at the time of trial. 165 
Viewed as an original matter, the language and history of the sixth 
amendment do not pose an insuperable barrier to radical alteration of 
the hearsay rule. Its text is susceptible to an interpretation that would 
liberate the hearsay rule from constitutional constraints. Even assum-
ing the propriety of a strict intentionalist perspective, the history of 
the amendment does not provide a clear basis for rejecting such an 
interpretation. Nonetheless, the sixth amendment is an obstacle to 
radical reform given the established body of judicial precedent that 
interprets the amendment as putting substantial restrictions on the ad-
mission of hearsay. 
The Supreme Court has never adopted either of the extreme inter-
pretations of the confrontation clause. In its first case interpreting the 
clause, it rejected the absolute exclusion view by recognizing that dy-
ing declarations were admissible, despite the fact that the defendant 
had never confronted the declarant. 166 Four years later, the Court ef-
fectively rejected the view that the confrontation clause allows unlim-
ited legislative creation of new hearsay exceptions, by holding 
unconstitutional a federal statute that permitted a third party's convic-
tion to be used, in a prosecution for receiving stolen goods, as evidence 
against the receiver that the goods were in fact stolen. 167 Subsequent 
cases steered between the two extremes of absolute exclusion of hear-
say and absolute deference to hearsay exceptions. It is difficult to gen-
eralize about these cases, because they dealt with particular situations 
164. Id. at 213-14. 
165. Id. at 209-10. 
166. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895) (dictum). See also Kirby v. 
United States, 174 U.S. 47, 61 (1899) (dictum) ("[T]he admission of dying declarations is an 
exception which arises from the necessity of the case. This exception was well established before 
the adoption of the Constitution, and was not intended to be abrogated."). 
167. Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899). The actual statute made the conviction 
conclusive evidence that the goods were stolen, but the Court did not rest its decision on this 
ground. Instead, it made clear that merely admitting the third party's convictiqn into evidence 
was a violation of the confrontation clause. 174 U.S. at 55-56, 61. 
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without establishing a general principle. 168 In the 1980 case of Ohio v. 
Roberts, 169 however, the Court found majority support for an opinion 
that outlined a general approach to resolving confrontation issues. 
The Roberts Court established a two-pronged test for determining 
whether the introduction of hearsay violated the confrontation clause. 
The first prong of the Roberts test requires that the prosecution 
produce the hearsay declarant or demonstrate that the declarant is un-
available.110 The scope of this prong is limited, however. It only ap-
plies in the "usual" case; 171 the prosecution need not demonstrate 
unavailability in cases in which the utility of confrontation is 
"remote." 172 
The second prong of the Roberts test requires that the hearsay have 
"adequate 'indicia of reliability.' " 173 In some cases, this prong re-
quires "a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.'' 
However, the Court recognized that the need for certainty in criminal 
trials requires more specific guidance. 174 It indicated that deference 
should be given to established hearsay exceptions, saying that reliabil-
ity could be inferred "without more" when evidence fell under a 
168. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (introduction of testimony from preliminary 
hearing at which defendant was not represented, and at which he did not cross-examine the 
witness, violates sixth amendment as applied to states); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965) 
(allowing prosecutor to, in effect, use accomplice's statement as evidence against defendant is 
unconstitutional in circumstances of case); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) (introducing 
declarant's former testimony against defendant, without sufficient attempt to produce declarant 
for trial, violates confrontation clause); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (admitting 
codefendant's confession implicating both defendants violates confrontation clause, despite limit-
ing instruction); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (receiving witness' prior inconsistent 
statement as substantive evidence permissible under circumstances of case); Dutton v. Evans, 400 
U.S. 74 (1970) (receiving coconspirator's prior statement to cellmate permissible under circum· 
stances of case). 
In a concurring opinion, in California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 182, Justice Harlan advocated a 
general theory - that the confrontation clause required the production of available witnesses, 
but had no application when the witness was unavailable - but the majority did not adopt it and 
he soon afterward abandoned it himself. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. at 95-100 (Harlan, J., 
concurring). Justice Harlan changed his views because he had come to believe that requiring the 
production of available declarants in every case would be unduly inconvenient and of little util· 
ity. His later view was that the confrontation clause should be construed only to guarantee the 
right to be present at trial and cross-examine the witnesses there presented. In flagrant cases, 
however, the misuse of hearsay might constitute a violation of due process. 400 U.S. at 98. 
169. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
170. 448 U.S. at 65. 
171. "In the usual case (including cases where prior cross-examination has occurred), the 
prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose state-
ment it wishes to use against the defendant." 448 U.S. at 65. 
172. 448 U.S. at 65 n.7. 
173. 448 U.S. at 66. 
174. See, e.g., 448 U.S. at 66 (referring to the "need for certainty in the workaday world of 
criminal trials" as one reason why, in past cases, the Court had concluded that "certain hearsay 
exceptions rest upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within them 
comports with the 'substance of the constitutional protection'"). 
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"firmly rooted" hearsay exception.11s 
The Roberts analysis appears to remain intact, though shifting ma-
jorities and the Court's checkered record on confrontation issues may 
be reason to doubt the longevity of any theory about the scope of the 
clause. In the course of holding that Roberts' unavailability require-
ment does not apply to statements received as admissions of a cocon-
spirator, 176 a later majority showed some inclination to limit Roberts 
to its facts. 177 But both majority and dissent in the Court's most re-
cent confrontation clause cases seem to have taken Roberts at its word 
and to have assumed that it states the general framework of 
analysis. 178 . 
Whatever the wavering course of its doctrine, the Supreme Court 
has consistently adhered to the view that the confrontation clause does 
more than guarantee that the defense has a right to confront only 
those witnesses the prosecution cares to produce. Judicial interpreta-
tion of the clause has given it a substantial role in preventing the free 
reception of hearsay. 179 While the Court has deferred to firmly estab-
lished hearsay exceptions, 180 its opinions indicate that novel ones will 
be subjected to greater scrutiny. This approach is not an inevitable 
consequence of either the text or history of the confrontation clause, 
but it manifests an established judicial attitude. Legislation that at-
tempts radical change at either the state or federal level would inevita-
bly meet constitutional challenge - challenge that would, judging 
175. 448 U.S. at 66. The Court indicated in a footnote that dying declarations fell under a 
"firmly rooted" hearsay exception, and implied that hearsay falling under the business records 
and public records exceptions would also pass confrontation clause scrutiny, at least where those 
exceptions were "properly administered." 448 U.S. at 66 n.8. Subsequently, in Bourjaily v. 
United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775 (1987), the Court held that no particularized showing of reliability 
need be made when evidence meets the requirements of FED. R. Evm. 80l(d)(2)(E) (statements 
of coconspirators). 
176. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986). Jnadi reasoned that the coconspirators· 
statements had an evidentiary significance that could not be duplicated by in-court testimony. 
475 U.S. at 395. 
177. The Court stated that "Roberts must be read consistently with the question it answered, 
the authority it cited, and its own facts. All of these indicate that Roberts simply reaffirmed a 
longstanding rule ... that applies unavailability analysis to prior testimony:• 475 U.S. at 394 
(citations omitted). 
178. See Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2056, 2064-65 (1986); Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S. 
Ct. 2775 (1987). For a useful analysis of the current status of Roberts, see United States v. Ber-
nard S., 795 F.2d 749, 753-56 (9th Cir. 1986). 
179. See Lee, 106 S. Ct. 2056 (1986); cases cited in note 168 supra. 
180. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (dictum) (confrontation clause does not 
require additional showing of reliability when case falls within a "firmly rooted hearsay excep-
tion"); G. LILLY, supra note 21, at 277-78 ("If the statements in question fall within a hearsay 
exception and thus have the imprimatur of judicial and legislative experience, this fact should 
weigh heavily in favor of a determination that the right to confrontation has been satisfied."). 
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from past practice, often succeed. That fact alone provides one reason 
for not attempting radical reform in criminal cases. 
The confrontation clause is not, however, a complete answer to 
those who advocate liberalizing the hearsay rule in criminal cases. If 
there are strong functional justifications for relaxing the hearsay rule, 
then the appropriate legislative course might still be to seek broad re-
form, and hope that in the long run courts would cooperate by inter-
preting the confrontation clause to permit such reform to stand. 
Nothing in the history or text of the clause would render such an in-
terpretation illegitimate. While judicial precedent under the clause is 
an obstacle to broad reform, ultimately the issue of reform must be 
judged on its merits. Therefore, I will examine functional considera-
tions that justify maintaining a more restrictive attitude toward hear-
say in criminal cases than in civil cases. 
2. Unreliability and Misvaluation 
Several differences between civil and criminal cases justify different 
treatment of hearsay evidence. One major difference lies in the sources 
of the statements that would become admissible under a liberal view of 
the admissibility of hearsay. Criminal cases often tum upon the evi-
dence of accomplices and informers. The evidence of accomplices has 
always been considered suspect because of the motive to shift blame, 
curry favor, or retaliate against an unfaithful partner. 181 Moreover, 
accomplice statements that are not admissible under traditional hear-
say exceptions182 are often those given in response to police interroga-
181. See, e.g., Lee, 106 S. Ct. at 2056, 2062 {describing dangers of accepting accusations of 
accomplices); State v. Spadafore, 159 W. Va. 236, 251, 220 S.E.2d 655, 664 (1975) ("Frequently 
witnesses in criminal cases are implicated in the criminal activity at issue . . . and the 
prosecutorial authorities can induce fear, a sense of guilt, and panic, in such a way as to cause 
distortion of the facts."). Suspicion of accomplices has led to judicial instructions admonishing 
the jury to use caution in evaluating their testimony and, in some jurisdictions, to requirements 
that testimony of accomplices be corroborated. See 7 WIGMORE (Chadbourn ed.), supra note 8, 
§ 2056. 
182. Some of the existing exceptions and exemptions are tailored so that they do not provide 
a basis for receiving statements of accomplices given in response to police interrogation. For 
example, the rule exempting coconspirator's declarations requires that the statement be made in 
furtherance of and during the course of the conspiracy, in effect preventing the reception of 
statements obtained by station house interrogation. See FED. R. Evm. 801{d)(2). The rule per· 
milting substantive use of prior inconsistent statements would, as originally proposed, have per-
mitted the reception of statements obtained during interrogation when the witness testified 
inconsistently on the stand, see text at note 111 supra, but the rule was amended in Congress so 
that it now applies only to statements given under oath in a trial or other proceeding. See FEt>. 
R. Evm. 80l{d)(l){A). The statements may still be usable for impeachment, but not ifthe prose-
cutor's sole purpose in calling the witness is to put the statement before the jury. See note 110 
supra. The declaration against interest rule does not, however, contain any express prohibition of 
use of accomplice statements or use of statements obtained during interrogation. A provision 
that would have attempted to codify the doctrine of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 
(1968), by providing that the exception did not cover "a statement or confession offered against 
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tion, with the police interrogators playing on the subject's desire to 
shift blame. 183 Informers, by the nature of their work, lead lives of 
pretension and duplicity and are often susceptible to pressures to in-
criminate others. 
The unreliability of informers and accomplices would not be a rea-
son for excluding their hearsay statements if the jury could assess 
them accurately. Yet the problem of assessment is quite different from 
that presented by the ordinary witness in a civil case. It is easy to 
understand, for example, how the interest of a party in a civil case 
might influence the party. The assessment of reliability of an informer 
or accomplice requires an understanding of institutional practices with 
which jurors have had little experience. Jurors must take into account 
methods of police interrogation, the character of someone far outside 
their usual circles, and the effect of offers of immunity or leniency. 184 
A second source of evidence in criminal cases is police officers and 
other law enforcement personnel. Here the adversarial nature of their 
work creates a problem of reliability. 185 However, even if one assumes 
the accused in a criminal case, made by a codefendant or other person implicating both himself 
and the accused," appeared in the advisory committee's 1971 Proposal and in the House version 
of rule 803(b)(3), see note 228 infra, but was eliminated from the final version of the rules after 
having been stricken in the Senate. The conference committee reasoned that omitting this provi-
sion reflected "the general approach in the Rules of Evidence to avoid attempting to codify 
constitutional evidentiary principles." R.R. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12, re-
printed ill 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7051, 7106, and ill 4 BAILEY & TRELLES, 
supra note 14, Doc. 16, at 12. Limits on use of statements against penal interest for purposes of 
incriminating an accomplice of the declarant have therefore been left to case law development 
under the confrontation clause. For a case in which a declaration against interest was held inad-
missible on confrontation clause grounds, see Lee, 106 S. Ct. 2056 (1986). 
183. For interrogation manuals that describe shifting-the-blame techniques, see R. ARTHER 
& R. CAPUTO, INTERROGATION FOR INVESTIGATORS 44-45, 83-84 (1959); A. AUBRY, JR. & R. 
CAPUTO, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 121-22 (1980). 
184. For example, suppose a case in which the principal witness for the government is an 
informer who was once part of a drug ring, and who now is testifying for the prosecution in 
return for leniency. Examination of the witness may reveal bias caused by the offer of leniency. a 
prior record, a history of drug abuse, participation in the crimes charged, inexplicable lapses of 
memory, and other defects. It is true that these points could be made, in a less vivid fashion, by 
impeachment of the witness' out-of-court statement if he did not testify, but the impeachment is 
likely to lose some of its force. On the stand, the witness' lapses of memory and inconsistencies 
will be more vivid, and demeanor clues may include nervousness, dullness of affect, unrespon-
siveness, and even signs of drug use. The jury may not be able to foresee all of these things in its 
review of an out-of-court statement. 
185. While it is difficult to substantiate claims that police perjury is widespread (or that it is 
not), a number of observers have regarded it as a significant problem in criminal cases. See R. 
LEMPERT & S. SALTZRURG, supra note 27, at 513 & n.28 ("The policymaker cannot ignore a 
growing body of evidence that perjury is not an uncommon aspect of police work."); Younger, 
Co11sti111tio11al Protection 011 Search and Seizure Dead?, 3 TRIAL 41, 41 (Aug-Sep 1967) ("'[A]s 
every lawyer knows who practices in the criminal courts, police perjury is commonplace.""); Po-
lice Perjury: An Interview with Martin Garbus, 8 CRIM. L. BULL 363, 364-65 (1972) ("[I]n some 
thirteen years of practice I have handled perhaps 150 drug cases .... I cannot recall a single case 
- not one - where I was not convinced that to a greater or lesser degree the police witness 
shaped his testimony."); Grano, A Dilemma for Defense Co1111se/, 1971 U. ILL L.F. 405, 409 
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as a general matter that police officers are just as reliable as anyone 
else, the danger that jurors would misvalue their statements would still 
be a serious concern. If the out-of-court reports and other statements 
of police officers were to become freely admissible, jurors would often 
be faced with the naked choice of accepting them or rejecting them. A 
police report that claims personal knowledge and recounts detailed 
facts that incriminate a defendant cannot, in the absence of cross-ex-
amination, be effectively impeached. The question of impeachment 
implicates the jury's entire view of the reliability of law enforcement 
personnel, and its faith in the criminal justice system. Cross-examina-
tion is necessary so that individual defects in perception and opportu-
nity to observe can be explored, and can provide grounds for the jury 
to discount the testimony even if it is unwilling to believe that the 
testimony is consciously false. 
Other dangers would be created by admission of in-court testi-
mony by police officers about the statements of nonpolice declarants. 
First, this testimony would substitute an experienced professional wit-
ness for one who might be more vulnerable to impeachment. Second, 
the dangers of undetected misreport or fabrication are greater than 
with other witnesses. As I have argued earlier, it is often difficult to 
use cross-examination to expose problems of perception and opportu-
nity to observe when the witness is recounting a statement made in 
private. 186 The confident witness who testifies to certainty about the 
accuracy of his reporting of a statement forces the trier to decide, not 
whether he might be mistaken, but whether he is fabricating - either 
about the degree of certainty or about the statement itself. Cross-ex-
amination is probably less useful in exposing fabrication than in expos-
ing defects in memory and perception.187 Police officers who could 
freely testify about the statements of others would be tempted to fabri-
cate or exaggerate, with little fear of exposure. The mantle of legiti-
("[T]he threat of police perjury is much greater than most courts are willing to acknowledge."); 
A. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE xxi (1982); Oteri & Perratta, "Dropsy" E1•ide11ce and the 
Viability of the Exclusionary Rule, I CONT. DRUG PROB. 35 (1971); s. TERKEL, WORKING 138 
(1974); Wolchover, Police PeTjury in London, 136 NEW L.J. 181-83 (1986) (survey of barristers 
indicates that 75% agree with estimate that police perjury occurs in three out of ten trials in 
London criminal courts). For judicial expressions of concern about the possibility of widespread 
police perjury, see Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 365 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Veney v. 
United States, 344 F.2d 542, 543 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 852 (1965); People v. Mc-
Murty, 64 Misc. 2d 63, 64, 314 N.Y.S.2d 194, 196 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1970) (Younger, J.). 
186. See text at notes 30-31 supra. 
187. See Finman, Implied Assertions as Hearsay: Some Criticisms of the Uniform Rules of 
Evidence. 14 STAN. L. REV. 682, 690-91 & n.22 (1962) (citing 3 F. BUSCH, LAW AND TACTICS 
IN JURY TRIALS 527 (1960); c. FRICKE, PLANNING AND TRYING CASES 367 (rev. ed. 1957); and 
F. WELLMAN, THE ART OF CROSS-EXAMINATION 53 (3d ed. 1924)); Morgan, supra note 41, at 
186. 
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macy that comes with the office is a difficult one to penetrate if the jury 
is presented only with the polar alternatives of believing the officer to 
be completely truthful or a liar. 
A third source of evidence in criminal cases is the defendant him-
self. Of course, statements by the defendant offered by the prosecution 
are freely admissible under existing law, unless the statement is a con-
fession obtained by illegal methods. 188 The effect of abolition of the 
hearsay rule would be to make a defendant's statements admissible on 
his own behalf. This would encourage defense tactics designed to de-
prive the jury of the opportunity to observe the cross-examination of 
the defendant. The defendant is always available for testimony in a 
criminal case, with the rare exception of cases tried in absentia because 
the defendant has fled after the commencement of trial. 189 Yet, in 
contrast to civil cases, the defendant cannot be compelled by the op-
posing party to submit to cross-examination.190 Abolition of the hear-
say rule would allow the defendant to tell his or her story through 
other witnesses without ever having to submit to cross-examination. 
A fourth potential source of evidence is associates of the defendant 
who are prepared to testify that another person has confessed to the 
crime charged. Lawmakers have long recognized that this testimony 
is likely to be unreliable because of fabrication by the in-court witness 
or the out-of-court declarant. 191 Because of this concern, a provision 
requiring corroboration of confessions offered to exonerate was in-
cluded in the Federal Rules of Evidence. 192 The question whether 
188. See FED. R. EVID. 80l(d)(2); McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 6, § 144. 
189. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 43 (trial cannot take place in defendant's absence, unless the 
defendant has voluntarily absented himself after the trial has commenced, or unless the defen-
dant is removed for disruption after having been warned). See generally Cohen, Can They Kill 
Me if I'm Gone: Trial by Absentia in Capital Cases, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 273 (1984). 
190. In criminal cases, the defendant has the right not to take the stand at all, and the prose-
cution may not comment upon the defendant's refusal to testify. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 882-86 (1985); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). In civil cases, 
either party may call the opponent as a witness for cross-examination, see McCORMICK ON Ev1-
DENCE, supra note 6, § 121; FED. R. EvID. 6ll(c), and ifthe opponent claims a privilege against 
self-incrimination, the jury may draw inferences from his refusal to testify and the party calling 
him may comment upon the refusal. See 8 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERI-
CAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW§ 2272, at 439 (McNaughton rev. ed. 
1961) [hereinafter WIGMORE (McNaughton ed.)]; Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318-19 
(1976). Moreover, a number of jurisdictions permit sanctioning a party who refuses to testify 
with dismissal of the party's case. See Christenson v. Christenson, 281 Minn. 507, 162 N.W.2d 
194 (1968), and authorities cited therein. 
191. See text at notes 128-35 supra. Cf. CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMITIEE, ELEVENTH 
REPORT, ~ 229 (1972) (citing danger of manufactured evidence by defendant as reason for more 
stringent rule governing reception of hearsay in criminal cases). Cf. House Special Subcomm. 
Hearings, supra note 50, at 252-53, 264-65 (testimony of Hon. Henry J. Friendly supporting 
traditional rule excluding declarations against penal interest). 
192. See FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3); text at notes 130-35 supra. 
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such evidence should be freely admitted is not an easy one, 193 but it 
must at least be conceded that the circumstances give rise to greater 
dangers of abuse than exist in civil cases. 
Another source of evidence in criminal cases is the victim of the 
crime. It is risky to generalize about the reliability of victim state-
ments because they cover a broad range. They include the dispassion-
ate statement of the merchant identifying stolen merchandise, the 
vindictive accusation of the victim of a two-way fight, statements of 
identification made under a variety of circumstances, and others. It 
can be said, however, that abolition of the hearsay rule would let in a 
variety of victim statements that are likely to be unreliable in a way 
193. Because of dangers of declarant unreliability and witness fabrication, it seems clear that 
such statements should be excluded when the declarant is available for testimony. The out·of-
court statement may have been the product of intimidation by the defendant or other improper 
influence. On the stand, subject to penalties of perjury and (in some cases) to enhanced possibil-
ity of punishment for the crime with which defendant is charged, the witness may tell a quite 
different story. Moreover, the danger that intimidation will influence the testimony is dimin-
ished. Violent pretrial intimidation serves a rational preventive purpose - it may cause the 
witness to give an exonerating statement. Post-trial violence against a witness who has turned 
against the defendant cannot cure the harm done, and is more dangerous to the defendant, who is 
a very natural suspect. The witness may realize this and be more forthcoming at trial than in the 
circumstances in which the pre-trial statement was given. 
Even if the declarant is unavailable, substantial arguments can be made for exclusion. First, 
there is the danger that the declarant is not really unavailable, but is merely being kept out of the 
way. Secondly, in the case of an indisputably unavailable declarant, the opportunity for in-court 
fabrication is enhanced because there is no danger that the declarant will appear and withdraw 
the statement. Once again, the confident witness can confront the trier with the flat alternative of 
either accepting the testimony or labeling the witness a liar; cross-examination as to perception 
and memory is likely to be ineffective. See text at notes 30-31 supra. Moreover, the danger of 
out-of-court fabrication is greater: the declarant may know at the time that he confesses to the 
crime with which the defendant is charged that he will not be around to take responsibility, and 
hence may feel little compunction to tell the truth. 
Misgivings about declarant and witness reliability would not be a sufficient basis for excluding 
exonerating statements were the jury able to evaluate them properly. Certainly, however, there 
are obstacles to evaluation, especially when the statement lacks the sort of corroboration now 
required by the Federal Rules of Evidence. The jury is typically faced with a statement which, if 
both the in-court witness and the declarant are believed, requires a not guilty verdict. The de-
clarant cannot be cross-examined or observed; there may be a wealth of impeaching material that 
cannot be explored at all, and other material that cannot be explored vividly. The in-court wit-
ness can be cross-examined, but the examination is hampered in important respects. The stan-
dard of proof is reasonable doubt. Lawmakers believe experience teaches that uncorroborated 
statements do not generally raise a reasonable doubt. The jury, however, does not deal with the 
generality of cases, but freshly with the one before it, under strict instructions to re~olve doubts 
in favor of the defendant. If the statement is admitted, it must form a conception of the circum-
stances under which it was offered, including, for example, the dangers of coercion in ~ettings 
with which the jury is not familiar, including prisons in which inmates hold as much power as 
officials. Moreover, the jury must come to a decision without a broad-ranging investigation of all 
the situational forces at work. If the accumulated experience of lawmakers is that these ~tntc­
ments are virtually worthless, then the hearsay rule may be an appropriate way of passing on that 
experience, at least in cases where the statement is uncorroborated. 
Nonetheless, it is difficult to avoid the appeal of Wigmore's argument that "the truth is that 
any rule which hampers an honest man in exonerating himself is a bad rule, even if it also ham-
pers a villain in falsely passing for an innocent." 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 3, 
§ 1477, at 289. 
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that could be illuminated by cross-examination. This is certainly the 
case with identification statements, which are notoriously unreliable 
and in need of full exploration. 194 Moreover, incomplete abolition, if 
it turned upon the discretion of the trial judge, would allow that dis-
cretion to be exercised over a wide range of reliable and unreliable 
statements. 
Another feature of criminal cases applies to all of the types of wit-
nesses that I have been describing. Generally, out-of-court statements 
relevant to criminal cases are made, in the broadest sense, with a view 
to litigation, or at least with knowledge that the legal process may be 
brought to bear on the matter being described. This is true whether 
the statement is a pre-crime statement by someone with knowledge of 
the alleged plan, or a post-crime statement by an informer, accom-
plice, police officer, or victim. Statements that fall outside of this cate-
gory often concern rather unmemorable matters (for example, the 
appearance of a person who bought an airline ticket) and themselves 
carry problems of trustworthiness. Moreover, many of the declarants' 
statements are taken by police, often under interrogation - a process 
essential in producing investigative leads but not calculated to elicit 
spontaneous statements that spring from a spirit of candor. 
Attempting to draw a general contrast with civil cases is a risky 
venture. Civil cases fall across a broad range, from complex antitrust 
litigation to simple personal injury cases, and the persons with knowl-
edge of relevant facts are similarly diverse. Nevertheless, it is fair to 
note the absence, or at least greatly diminished role, of declarants who 
are informers, accomplices, or prisoners. Police officers sometimes 
have relevant knowledge, but the outcome of a case does not normally 
affect their professional status. The parties may call each other to the 
stand for cross-examination if self-serving out-of-court statements are 
introduced by an available opponent. New trials may be granted on 
behalf of either party if the jury is sufficiently misled by hearsay evi-
dence. Impeachment material is likely to be less rich than in criminal 
cases, diminishing the need for observation of witnesses as they are 
confronted with evidence undermining character and credibility. 
Moreover, achieving a settlement that satisfies the parties may be as 
important as any other goal. Giving the parties freedom to offer the 
same evidence that they would use in resolving disputes in ordinary 
life should promote, not detract from, achieving that goal. 
194. See State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983) (exploring dangers of eyewit-
ness identification and allowing expert testimony on the subject). See generally E. LOFTUS, EYE-
WITNESS TESTIMONY (1979). 
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3. The Element of Surprise 
In Parts I and II of this article, I described the five principal con-
cerns of the hearsay rule. So far, I have mainly focused in this Part 
upon the first two concerns: the possible unreliability of an untested 
declarant, and the possibility of undetected fabrication or misreport by 
the in-court witness. I now turn to a third concern: the danger of 
unfair surprise at trial. 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide many techniques by 
which a litigant may seek to obtain information about hearsay testi-
mony that may be offered by the opposing party. Depositions can be 
used to explore the knowledge of witnesses, including knowledge ob-
tained by hearsay. 195 The opposing party may be questioned through 
written interrogatories.196 Pretrial lists of witnesses and of documents 
that will be offered in evidence may be required by the court. 197 Prior 
statements of witnesses may be obtained upon a showing of need, 198 
and in some jurisdictions without any showing. 199 In criminal pro-
ceedings, the rules of discovery are much more restrictive.20° For ex-
ample, under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, depositions are 
permitted only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances; their 
purpose is to preserve testimony for use at trial, not to provide discov-
ery. 201 The defendant is not entitled to a transcript of grand jury testi-
mony as a matter of right,202 and prior statements of prosecution 
witnesses may be obtained of right only after the direct testimony of 
the witness. 203 
Of course, in a reform aimed at making hearsay freely admissible 
in criminal cases, the problem of notice could be handled by making 
specific notice a precondition for the admission of hearsay, or at least a 
precondition for admission of hearsay that did not fall under a tradi-
tional exception. Yet the influences that now limit criminal discovery 
would affect this notice provision, either making the reform more lim-
ited than what is desired, or making the notice provision partially inef-
195. See FED. R. C1v. P. 26, 30. 
196. FED. R. C1v. P. 33. 
197. Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gives trial judges authority to require 
lists of witnesses and documents to be offered at trial, though they are not required to exercise 
this authority. FED. R. C1v. P. 16; 6 c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 86, § 1525, at 589 & 
Supp. {I 987), at 316. 
198. See FED. R. C1v. P. 26(b)(3). 
199. See, e.g .. MINN. R. C1v. P. 26.02(3). 
200. See generally W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 190, at 725-64. 
201. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a). 
202. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(3). 
203. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2); Jencks Act, 18 u.s.c. § 3500 (1982). 
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fective. In criminal cases, discovery from the prosecution is restricted 
because of fear of intimidation and fabrication by the defendant. Dis-
covery from the defense is restricted because of concerns about self-
incrimination and a feeling that if discovery from prosecution files is 
limited, reciprocity requires that discovery from defense files also be 
limited.204 Witnesses who report hearsay declarations are as vulnera-
ble to intimidation as any other, and defendants can fabricate evidence 
to counter hearsay declarations as easily as they can fabricate any 
other evidence. Prosecutors would be reluctant to give notice for the 
same reason that they are now reluctant to give discovery. Moreover, 
the uncertainty of a criminal trial, with its turncoat witnesses and sur-
prise testimony, would discourage pretrial notice; parties often do not 
know that certain evidence is needed before seeing what actually hap-
pens at trial.2°5 For this reason, the federal courts have shown a 
marked tendency to ignore the requirement of pretrial notice that is 
now embodied in the residual exceptions.206 I am not saying that 
hearsay reform based upon notice would be totally futile in criminal 
cases. Certainly a provision making evidence freely admissible upon 
notice would result in the admission of some evidence that is now ex-
cluded. However, there would still be temptations to forego notice in 
hopes that a traditional exception could be stretched to cover the 
case207 or that the judge would ignore the notice requirement. Finally, 
notice alone would not put the criminal defendant in the same position 
as a civil litigant. The civil discovery rules provide an opportunity for 
pretrial examination of available declarants. Armed with information 
from depositions or discovery of witness statements, the civil litigant is 
in a better position to decide whether to combat the opponent's hear-
204. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 190, at 725-28. 
205. Moreover, the desire for a speedy determination - and, in many jurisdictions, the use 
of a twelve-person jury - makes it more difficult to give continuances during trial than is the 
case in civil actions. 
206. Both residual exceptions provide that 
a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes 
known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the 
adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the state-
ment and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant. 
FED. R. Evm. 803(24), 804(b)(5). Several circuits have declined to follow the literal language of 
the rules. See United States v. Parker, 749 F.2d 628, 633 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. 
Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 299 n.1 (4th Cir. 1984) (dictum); Piva v. Xerox Corp., 654 F.2d 591, 595 
(9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1355 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 
U.S. 914 (1977); United States v. Leslie, 542 F.2d 285, 291 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. 
Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 348 (3d Cir. 1978). But see United States v. Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 
1978) (notice requirement interpreted strictly); United States v. Atkins, 618 F.2d 366, 372 (5th 
Cir. 1980) (same, in alternative holding). 
207. This argument assumes that the traditional exceptions would be retained as a supple-
ment to a notice system. For a discussion of the impracticality of a pure notice system that did 
not retain traditional exceptions, see Part 111.B.2.a.(3) infra. 
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say evidence by calling the declarant for cross-examination. Without 
such information, calling the declarant is a risky proposition, and trial 
lawyers are notoriously reluctant to step onto untested ground. To 
call a witness for cross-examination and then fail to accomplish any-
thing can be a dramatic setback - whatever the judge may have told 
the jury about the adverse nature of the examination.2os 
The comparisons that I have made between civil and criminal 
cases describe some particular problems that are created by unreliable 
declarants, unreliable witnesses, and unfair surprise. A full evaluation 
of the effect of hearsay exclusion in criminal cases requires a broader 
perspective, one that considers these particular problems in the con-
text of the role of the hearsay rule in controlling the exercise of gov-
ernmental power, and that considers as well the systemic effect of the 
exclusion upon the criminal justice system. 
4. Hearsay and Government Power 
The hearsay rule contributes to achieving two important goals in 
the criminal justice system: individualization of the determination of 
guilt, and independence of the decisionmaker. The goal of individuali-
zation is achieved when the trier's decision is not a vote of confidence 
for or against the government, but a unique determination about the 
guilt of the particular defendant. Independence is achieved when the 
fact finder is protected from external pressure, free of prejudgment, 
and capable of rendering a final decision that will be respected. 
The hearsay rule, by requiring the production of live testimony, 
serves both of these goals. At the most basic level, a rule preferring 
live testimony helps keep a trial from becoming a show trial, in which 
hesitant or inarticulate witnesses are kept offstage, and things move 
smoothly to a preordained conclusion of guilt. Yet even putting aside 
the dangers of show trials, the hearsay rule contributes to individuali-
zation and independence. Prejudgment is more difficult, and outside 
pressure is reduced, because no one has the full facts before trial; the 
results of confrontation, cross-examination, and observation of de-
208. Cf. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 409-10 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In the 
course of arguing that the confrontation clause required exclusion of the coconspirator'& stale· 
ments if the declarant was available, Justice Marshall stated: 
Even when a defendant is in as good a position as the prosecution to subpoena available 
declarants, a rule requiring him to call those declarants as his own witnesses may deny the 
defendant certain tactical advantages. . . . [I]f the defendant chooses to call the declarant as 
a defense witness, defendant risks bolstering in the jury's eyes the very conspiracy allega-
tions he wishes to rebut. That the witness is viewed as hostile by the defendant, and has 
possibly been certified as such by the trial judge, does not necessarily mean that his relation-
ship to the defendant will be so perceived by the jury, unless defense counsel choose& to 
dramatize the antagonism with hyperbole that might lose him the sympathy of the jury. 
475 U.S. at 409-10. 
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meanor cannot be known beforehand. The jury is witnessing a unique 
event. It is charged with determining the credibility of the individuals 
before it, not the credibility in general of government agents or other 
classes of absent witnesses. When live testimony is offered in lieu of 
hearsay, the trier can resolve conflicts of evidence with a legitimacy 
that cannot be claimed by outsiders. The idea that deference should 
be given to the body that saw and heard the witnesses is a powerful 
one. The experience of the jury cannot be described beforehand or 
duplicated afterwards. 
The requirement of live testimony also has an influence upon the 
government's data gathering. Dossiers are prepared for investigation, 
not for trial. Statement-takers have less power, and less reason to 
abuse it. There is less incentive to obtain statements by coercion when 
those statements will not be admissible, and when the coerced or mal-
treated witness may, on the stand, reveal what was done. There is less 
reason to induce witnesses to sign statements that have been distorted 
by statement-takers. If a witness' statement does not conform to his 
later live testimony, the statement-taker's distortion may be self-
defeating. 
Of course, even if the hearsay rule were abolished (and the con-
frontation clause reinterpreted to permit its abolition), the defendant's 
right to subpoena witnesses would give the defendant an opportunity 
to obtain live testimony. Yet the hearsay rule has an independent ef-
fect. It discourages the prosecution from keeping witnesses out of the 
way. Also, the state is much more able to track down witnesses -
who can often be elusive in criminal cases - so the hearsay rule shifts 
a significant practical burden to the party best able to bear it. Further-
more, the defendant has good reason to hesitate before calling a wit-
ness for cross-examination when the witness' testimony may be 
damaging, especially since the defendant does not have the aid of state 
compulsion in obtaining a pretrial statement from a reluctant or hos-
tile witness. 
Finally, the hearsay rule reinforces standard of proof rules that 
allocate the risk of mistake in criminal cases. Liberalization of hearsay 
rules could result in an increased number of decisions in which guilt is 
found despite the presence of a reasonable doubt. To be sure, reason-
able doubt instructions will be given whether or not hearsay is admit-
ted, but the admission of evidence that cannot easily be evaluated 
raises the danger that a mistaken or prejudiced trier will find guilt 
where an objective observer would find a reasonable doubt.209 Protec-
209. To use a quantitative example, suppose that the proponent of hearsay bears the burden 
of persuasion, the evidence on a crucial element is hearsay, and that an objective educated guess 
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tion of the values underlying the reasonable doubt standard may re-
quire not only that the reasonable doubt instruction be given, but that 
courts be chary of admitting evidence that could lead to erroneous or 
lawless determinations of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
From both a short- and long-term perspective, the risks of declar-
ant unreliability, witness unreliability, surprise, and discretion are 
greater in criminal cases than in civil cases. Furthermore, the danger 
of harmful systemic effects is greater. These considerations justify a 
different attitude toward hearsay in civil and criminal cases. 
B. Evaluation of Reform Possibilities 
1. Introduction 
In the foregoing pages, I have attempted to show that the concerns 
that justify excluding hearsay apply much more strongly in criminal 
than in civil cases. This section discusses reforms which would imple-
ment the view that hearsay should be more freely admitted in civil 
cases than in criminal cases. 
One preliminary question must be addressed: Whether it is wise, 
even if one recognizes that there are significant differences between 
civil and criminal cases, to attempt to codify different rules for the two 
subject matter areas. Such a codification might be objected to on the 
grounds that it would sacrifice uniformity, thereby making it more dif-
ficult for judges and lawyers to perform effectively in both types of 
cases. 
The first answer to this objection is that we already have different 
rules in criminal and civil cases. To some extent the differences are 
specifically recognized in the Federal Rules ofEvidence,210 and in con-
frontation clause case law that supplements the hearsay rule.211 To 
some extent they are embodied in the attitude of appellate judges in 
according less discretion to trial judges who admit or exclude hearsay 
in criminal cases.212 Codification of different rules would, in part, 
would place its probative value at 50. Translating standards of proof into rough numerical 
terms, suppose that the evidence must be given a value of 51 to meet the civil standard, and a 
value of 95 to meet the criminal standard. If the trier of fact prejudicially overvalues the hearsay 
by assigning a value of 95, then it will find for the proponent in either a civil or criminal case. In 
the civil case it will have reached a result that is not far wrong, and that may well be right, given 
the uncertainties of even an objective guess. In a criminal case, it has reached an unjust result, if 
we accept as valid the underlying premises of the reasonable doubt standard. The standard of 
proof in criminal cases gives the trier a larger range over which to overvalue, and hence a greater 
chance of reaching a patently unjust result. 
210. See text at notes 145-51 supra. 
211. See text at notes 154-80 supra. 
212. See note 151 supra and accompanying text. 
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merely be a recognition of differences that already exist, and an at-
tempt to make them more clear and explicit. 
The second answer is that the benefit of attempting to encourage 
joint civil and criminal practices by maintaining a superficially uni-
form hearsay code is dubious. Substantial obstacles already exist to 
the achievement of a high level of competence on both the civil and 
criminal sides of litigation. Not only is the substantive law completely 
different, but there are two different sets of codified procedural rules. 
Moreover, the additional knowledge needed to accommodate two sets 
of hearsay rules pales beside the many and changing details that the 
competent criminal lawyer must keep up with, such as local variations 
in sentencing practices, in administrative rules of parole and proba-
tion, and in rules and practices governing plea bargaining. In any 
event, codification might clarify differences and make it easier, not 
harder, to achieve competence in both fields. 
Another objection to codification of different sets of rules might 
rest upon the belief that case law development is preferable to a com-
prehensive code. Under this view, one might urge that the codified 
hearsay rules should be simple and permissive, and that they should 
apply to both criminal and civil cases. Constitutional doctrine under 
the confrontation clause would then provide additional protections to 
criminal defendants. The problem with this approach is twofold. 
First, common-law development of evidence rules left a corpus of law 
that was fragmentary, confusing, and increasingly ossified. The 
Supreme Court's sporadic forays into confrontation clause doctrine 
have not led to any better result. Rules of evidence that must be ap-
plied instantaneously in the courtroom need to be as clear and specific 
as possible. While perfect clarity cannot be achieved by any means, a 
code offers better chances than case law development.213 Although no 
code can completely free the law from the uncertainty of constitu-
tional litigation - the courts must still decide whether hearsay admit-
ted under a code violates the confrontation clause - it can provide 
substantially greater guidance. Courts are likely to defer to considered 
legislative judgments that take confrontation values into account.214 
A code that makes an attempt to do so - especially one that seeks to 
go beyond the minimum protection provided by the Constitution -
will provide better guidance than one that turns its back on these val-
ues and expressly leaves them to the courts for protection.215 More-
213. Cf Lewis, supra note 99. 
214. See authorities cited in note 180 supra. 
215. In their present form, the Federal Rules of Evidence provide substantial guidance. 
Many of the confrontation problems considered by the Supreme Court have arisen in review of 
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over, a code that liberalized the hearsay rule for both criminal and 
civil cases, leaving the protection of criminal defendants to constitu-
tional doctrine, would simply not provide enough protection for crimi-
nal defendants. The reasons for excluding hearsay are strong enough 
in criminal cases to justify legislative recognition. They should not be 
ignored in favor of an approach that left the protection of confronta-
tion values to whatever the current Supreme Court majority believes is 
the minimum requirement of the confrontation clause. 
Finally, the quest for superficial uniformity in the codified version 
of the hearsay rules has impeded needed reforms on the civil side. For 
example, a rule permitting unlimited substantive use of prior inconsis-
tent statements is innocuous in civil cases, and eliminates the need for 
confusing limiting instructions.216 Yet because of perceptions about 
what the rule might lead to in criminal cases, Congress limited it sig-
nificantly in a fashion that affects both civil and criminal cases.217 Re-
form in civil cases deserves to be considered on its merits, without 
being weighed down with baggage carried over from criminal cases. 
2. Reform in Criminal Cases 
Radical reform should not be attempted in criminal cases. The ex-
isting hearsay rules provide needed protection for defendants in crimi-
nal cases, and their existence cuts down on the volume of uncertain 
litigation under the confrontation clause. However, certain interstitial 
changes might clarify the law, provide additional protection, and bet-
state court cases in which hearsay was received that would not be admissible under the Federal 
Rules, absent an expansive interpretation of the residual exceptions. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 
U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation clause violated where state courts admitted former testimony that 
would not have been admissible under federal rule 804(b)(I), the former testimony exception to 
the hearsay rule); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) (same); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 
(1970) (no confrontation clause violation with respect to state court's admission of statement 
from preliminary hearing admissable under current federal rule 801(d)(l)(A) as substantive evi-
dence; remand for further fact-finding regarding reception of statement given to police which 
would not be admissable under rule 80l(d)(l)(A)); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (no 
violation where state court admitted coconspirator's statement that would not have been admissi-
ble under federal rule 801(d)(2)(E) because it was made after termination of conspiracy) (4-1-4 
decision). Cf Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899) (confrontation clause violated where 
trial judge admitted judgment of conviction of third person as evidence that goods were stolen; in 
federal prosecution for receiving stolen goods current federal rule 803(22) would not permit re-
ception of the evidence). But cf Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2056 (I 986) (state court's reception of 
accomplice's confession incriminating both defendant and accomplice violates confrontation 
clause). The confession in Lee might meet the requirements stated in the federal declarations 
against interest exception, FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(3). Congress decided not to attempt to limit 
rule 804(b)(3) to meet the requirements of confrontation clause case law. See note 228 infra. Cf. 
United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986) (no confrontation clause violation where reception of 
coconspirator's statement met the requirements of federal rule 80l(d)(2)(E); confrontation clause 
does not impose additional requirement that prosecution show that declarant is unavailable). 
216. See text at notes 106-08 supra. 
217. See text at notes 111-I 6 supra. 
October 1987] Hearsay Reform 107 
ter inform counsel how to prepare their cases. By crafting the existing 
hearsay rules in a fashion designed specifically to address the problems 
raised by admission of evidence in criminal cases, rulemakers might 
elicit decisions giving the Federal Rules of Evidence the degree of pre-
sumptive constitutional validity now accorded to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure,218 thereby removing much of the uncertainty that 
now attends the reception of hearsay evidence in criminal cases.219 
One topic that could be addressed in codifying criminal hearsay 
rules is whether and when the unavailability of the declarant is a pre-
requisite for admission of a hearsay statement. The Federal Rules of 
Evidence currently require a showing of unavailability as a precondi-
tion of admission only when the proponent seeks to invoke one of the 
five exceptions listed in rule 804. The twenty-four exceptions in rule 
803 and the provision admitting co-conspirators' statements contain 
no express requirement of unavailability. Superficially, it would seem 
that prosecutors could freely offer evidence under those exceptions 
even if the declarant were available for live testimony. Yet cases inter-
preting the confrontation clause have created uncertainty about 
whether a constitutional requirement of unavailability supplements 
the requirements of the Federal Rules.220 
The code should not establish a general unavailability requirement. 
Clearly, some hearsay should be admissible in criminal cases even if 
the declarant is available to testify. It would not make sense to require 
testimony from each person who forms a link in the chain that leads to 
the creation of a business record,221 or to exclude the record of a wit-
ness' prior conviction on grounds that the trier in the prior case was 
218. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-74 (1965). 
219. Courts already give substantial deference to exceptions established in the Federal Rules 
of Evidence. See note 180 supra. Exceptions to this pattern of deference may arise, however, 
where broad rules covering both civil and criminal cases have been adopted, with the expectation 
that courts will apply confrontation clause analysis to narrow them in criminal cases. For exam-
ple, had Lee, 106 S. Ct. 2056, involved review of a federal criminal trial, the Court would have 
been faced with the question whether the reception of evidence falling within the exception cre-
ated by ~ule 804(b)(3) violates the confrontation clause. Presumably, the answer would have 
been that the confrontation clause had been violated. Congress courted this conflict by deciding 
not to "codify constitutional evidentiary principles" in its final version of rule 804(b)(3). See note 
228 infra. 
220. In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980) (dictum), the Supreme Court indicated that 
"[i]n the usual case ... the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, 
the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant." The Roberts Court indi-
cated, however, that production of the declarant would not be required where the utility of cross-
examination was "remote." 448 U.S. at 65 n.7. Subsequently, in United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 
387 (1986), the Court held that this requirement does not apply to statements offered under 
federal rule 80l(d)(2)(E) as statements of a coconspirator. Its application in other contexts, how-
ever, remains unsettled. 
221. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 96 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Kirkpatrick, supra 
note 8, at 698-99. 
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available to testify under cross-examination about the basis for the ver-
dict. 222 Yet the greater need for protection against hearsay in criminal 
cases justifies a higher unavailability requirement than that observed 
in civil cases. Out-of-court statements directly accusing the defendant 
of a crime should not, for example, be admissible if the declarant is 
available to testify - though the present hearsay rules, taken apart 
from the confrontation clause, leave this possibility open.223 Existing 
scholarship, though directed at courts interpreting the confrontation 
clause, could profitably be used by codifiers in attempting to make the 
unavailability requirement more clear. Possibilities for clarity include 
general provisions requiring a showing of unavailability when the 
prior statement is accusatory224 or when one might reasonably expect 
that cross-examination would serve a purpose.225 Alternatively, one 
might seek greater specificity by examining the exceptions individu-
ally, and determining whether an unavailability requirement ought to 
be imposed upon hearsay admitted under particular exceptions.226 
The special problems raised by accomplices' and informers' state-
ments could also be dealt with specifically if criminal hearsay rules 
were codified separately. Specific exclusionary rules could address the 
problem of statements made while in custody or under interrogation. 
These statements are generally excluded under existing law,227 but the 
residual exceptions and the exception for declarations against penal 
interest leave open some possibilities for admission. 228 
The hearsay rules could also attempt to address the problem of 
222. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 8, at 692-93. 
223. See United States v. Barnes, 586 F.2d 1052, 1055-56 (5th Cir. 1978) (accusatory prior 
inconsistent statement of accomplice may be admissable under residual exception as substantive 
evidence against accused) (dictum). Among the exceptions that could be construed to admit 
accusatory statements despite the declarant's availability are rules 803(1) (present ~ense impres· 
sion), 803(2) (excited utterance), 803(6) (business records), and 803(8) (public records). 
224. Cf. Graham, The Co11fro11tatio11 Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and the Forgetful Witness, 56 
TEXAS L. REV. 151 (1978). 
225. Cf. Westen, supra note 8, at 1195. 
226. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 8. Kirkpatrick advocates different treatment of different 
exceptions, and sometimes different treatment of types of statements admissible under the same 
exception. See id. at 697-701 (discussing business records exception). 
227. See note 182 supra. 
228. The version of the Proposed Rules of Evidence transmitted by the Judicial Conference 
of the United States to the Supreme Court in 1971 contained a provision that would have ex-
cluded "a statement or confession offered against the accused in a criminal case, made by 11 
codefendant or other person implicating both himself and the accused." Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(4) 
(advisory comm. revised draft 1971), reprinted in 2 BAILEY & TRELLES, supra note 14, Doc. 6. 
The Supreme Court omitted this provision from the version of the Rules transmitted to Con· 
gress. See FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(4) (Supreme Court Proposed Draft 1973) reprinted in 2 BAILEY 
& TRELLES, supra note 14, Doc. 7. The advisory committee's limitation was reinstated in the 
House, but deleted in the Senate, see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1597, supra note 182, at 12, and was 
not enacted as part of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(3). The Confer-
ence Report stated that "[t]he Conferees agree to delete the provision regarding statements by u 
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witness intimidation in criminal cases. Possible reforms include re-
ceiving depositions taken under conditions supplying an adequate sub-
stitute for cross-examination. 229 
3. Reform in Civil Cases 
In civil cases, problems of declarant unreliability and witness 
fabrication are probably less serious than in criminal cases because of 
the different sources from which evidence is derived. Even where 
these problems exist, the jury is probably in a better position to evalu-
ate the testimony dispassionately and accurately. In any event, the 
danger of overvaluation of hearsay, while it can never be wholly elimi-
nated, can be reduced by use of procedural devices other than exclu-
sion. 230 Moreover, a relaxed attitude toward reception of hearsay 
would not undermine the policies served by the reasonable doubt stan-
dard in criminal cases, nor is the hearsay rule needed to serve as a 
shield against misuse of governmental power. Problems of unfair sur-
prise are less serious in civil cases because of the availability of more 
extensive discovery, and can be further reduced because requirements 
of notice of intent to introduce hearsay are more feasible in civil than 
in criminal cases. Finally, problems raised by abuse of judicial discre-
tion can be avoided by adopting a reform that avoids giving judges a 
general mandate to screen hearsay for reliability. 
The balance of this article considers specific means by which 
broader reform might be accomplished in civil cases. 
a. Reforms that eliminate class exceptions 
i. Pure abolition. The prospect of completely abolishing the hear-
say rule in civil cases has some attractive features. It would minimize 
judicial discretion and give the fact finder access to a greater quantity 
of relevant evidence. The danger that proponents would favor second-
best evidence would be mitigated to some extent by the fact that the 
opposing party could ask the trier to draw adverse inferences from the 
proponent's failure to produce the witness, and, in some cases, by the 
opponent's own capacity to call the missing witness for cross-examina-
tion. The danger that juries would overvalue hearsay would be miti-
gated by the trial judge's ability to grant a new trial. 
However, complete abolition, without any new procedural safe-
co-defendant, thereby reflecting the general approach in the Rules of Evidence to avoid attempt-
ing to codify constitutional evidentiary principles.'" H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1597, supra note 182. 
229. For a proposal of this nature, see M. GRAHAM, supra note 18, at 263-80. 
230. See text at note 255 infra. 
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guards, would raise dangers of surprise, fabrication, and jury overvalu-
ation, and would impede the speedy disposition of weak cases. In any 
event, it is not a politically acceptable solution at this time. The 
strength of the opposition to lesser measures proposed in the Model 
Code231 and in the original Federal Rules of Evidence232 suggests that 
complete abolition may be a long way away, even in civil cases. 
ii. A pure reliability rule. One seemingly simple and effective solu-
tion to the hearsay problem in civil cases would be to substitute a sin-
gle rule for the present system of class exceptions: Hearsay is 
admissible if it is reliable evidence.233 
To assess this proposal, one must first ask whether the reliability 
standard is intended merely to be flexible, or flexible and also discre-
tionary. If the standard is intended merely to promote flexibility -
that is, to allow trial and appellate judges to take into account all of 
the factors that bear upon the value of evidence, without being re-
stricted to considering the ones identified in particular hearsay excep-
tions - then appellate courts would be entitled to review trial court 
231. The Model Code was never adopted in any state. See 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 5005, at 88-89 (1977). The Code would have admitted 
hearsay freely when the declarant was unavailable, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 503 
(1942), and much of the opposition to the Code centered on this aspect. See, e.g., Chadbourn, 
supra note 1, at 945, and authorities cited therein. 
232. The 1971 revised draft of rule 804(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provided an 
exception applicable to unavailable declarants that was much more limited than rule 503 of the 
Model Code. It provided that ifthe declarant was unavailable as a witness, the hearsay rule did 
not exclude 
[a] statement, not in response to the instigation of a person engaged in investigating, litigat-
ing, or settling a claim, which narrates, describes, or explains an event or condition recently 
perceived by the declarant, made in good faith, not in contemplation of pending or antici-
pated litigation in which he was interested, and while his recollection was clear. 
FED. R. Evrn. (Advisory Comm. Revised Draft 1971), reprinted in 2 BAILEY & TRELLES, supra 
note 14, Doc. 6. This limited rule of preference was rejected by Congress. See 4J. WEINSTEIN & 
M. BERGER, supra note 133, 11 804(b)(5)[04]. A similar rule limited to civil cases might, how-
ever, prove more palatable. Weinstein and Berger report: 
Probably the most controversial aspect of what was a controversial proposed rule was its 
extension to criminal cases. Although this was the approach of the Uniform Rules [as well], 
it is contrary to the practice in most jurisdictions having some form of a recent perception 
rule. The wisdom of this extension has been questioned by a number of legal authorities 
who fear that overreaching and unscrupulous prosecutors could take advantage of such an 
exception to obtain unjustified convictions. 
Id. at 804-199, 804-200 (citations omitted). Cf. Chadbourn, supra note 1, at 951 (expressing 
qualms about the applying of a similar provision in the Uniform Rules to criminal cases); Quick, 
Hearsay, Excitement, Necessity and the Uniform Rules: A Reappraisal of Rule 63(4), 6 WAYNE 
L. REV. 204, 223 (1960) (same). 
233. For commentary favoring a general reliability standard, see Younger, supra note 44, at 
293; McCormick, Law and the Future: Evidence, 51 Nw. U. L. REV. 218, 219 (1956). Professor 
Younger, noting that hearsay is usually admitted, proposes that the rule be reformulated to read 
as follows: 
Hearsay is admissible unless the court decides as a preliminary question that the hearsay 
could not reasonably be accepted by the finder of fact as trustworthy. The finder of fact 
remains free to disbelieve admitted hearsay. 
Younger, supra note 44, at 293. 
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decisions without giving them special deference, just as they now re-
view personal jurisdiction decisions under a flexible test without giving 
special deference. If, however, the standard is intended to promote 
flexibility and discretion, then the role of the appellate courts would be 
minimal, just as it is now in reviewing trial court decisions to grant a 
new trial because the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. 
If the reliability rule was flexible without being discretionary, then 
it might not have the effect of cutting down on the number and com-
plexity of exceptions, but merely of decodifying them. Case law would 
once again be the primary source of information about when hearsay 
could be received. And whatever the value of a multi-factor "balanc-
ing test" administered by appellate courts in other contexts, its effect 
would be chaotic when applied to evidence decisions that need to be 
made in the heat of trial. Trial judges and lawyers need rules of 
thumb. Thus, the application of a general reliability standard, after its 
case law elaboration, would neither clarify nor necessarily liberalize 
the hearsay rule; it would simply return it to the process of case law 
development, with the attendant disadvantages of uncertainty and in-
consistency. The appellate cases construing the present reliability-
based residual exceptions are certainly as much of a hodgepodge as 
any list of standard exceptions has ever been. 234 
Suppose, however, that a discretionary reliability standard were 
adopted, one that gave trial judges a great deal of freedom in deciding 
whether to admit or exclude. An ancient but powerful objection may 
be made to this approach. Discretion to exclude or admit vital evi-
dence raises dangers of judicial partisanship, corruption, and plain bad 
judgment. Even with the fairest of judges, it raises the danger that 
each judge will develop his or her own hearsay "rules," so that to learn 
how to practice in a given locality would even more than now be a 
matter of learning how to practice before each particular judge. Also, 
even if (as would not be the case) litigants could inform themselves 
during the discovery process about all the items of hearsay the other 
party would offer, there would still be substantial difficulties in prepar-
ing for trial. One would not know whether to prepare to meet, per-
haps at great expense, evidence that will be offered by the other party 
and that might or might not be excluded. One would not know 
whether to develop alternative sources of proof for one's own evidence 
that might or might not be admitted. To the degree that disputes 
about the reception of important evidence are foreseeable, motions in 
234. See generally Sonenshein, supra note 143 (Professor Sonenshein illustrates that courts 
have not interpreted the residual exceptions consistently with their purposes or terms and that 
courts are divided on the interpretation of the exceptions.). 
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limine might provide partial relief from uncertainty; but these motions 
are another procedural complication, and are likely to come only after 
substantial pretrial preparation has already taken place. 
The codified exceptions do, at a minimum, create a core definition 
of what is admissible. 235 For example, admissions of a party-opponent 
are received without question, as are statements of injured persons 
about their present symptoms. Under a general reliability test, unin-
formed by past rules or past practice, there might be some doubt about 
these propositions.236 The arbitrary exclusion of hearsay can be as 
much a danger as the arbitrary admission of hearsay. 
If the general reliability test were interpreted as a discretionary 
standard which permitted the trial judge to freely admit or exclude, 
and to exclude even when evidence formerly fell within a conventional 
exception, the trial judge would be given extremely broad discretion. 
The power to exclude crucial evidence is the power to defeat a claim. 
It would be a discretionary power that allowed the trial judge to termi-
nate a meritorious claim or frustrate a valid defense, without review, 
often without an effective means of foreseeing the action or avoiding it 
by careful planning. 
iii. A pure notice system. Under a pure notice system, hearsay 
would be admissible if the proponent gave notice before trial of intent 
to offer it. The notice provision could include a requirement that the 
location of the declarant be given or, if the location was unknown, that 
the proponent explain why he was unable to locate the declarant. One 
might also provide a means for allowing the opponent to require that 
the proponent either produce a declarant for cross-examination or 
235. See United States v. DiMaria, 727 F.2d 265, 270-72 (2d Cir. 1984) (Friendly, J.). The 
DiMaria case holds that statements that fall under the class exceptions to the hearsay rule are 
admissible even if the trial judge believes them to be untrustworthy. 
[T]he scheme of the Rules is to determine [credibility] by categories; if a declaration comes 
within a category defined as an exception, the declaration is admissible without any prelimi-
nary finding of probable credibility by the judge, save for the "catch-all" exceptions of Rules 
803(24) and 804(b)(5) and the business records exception of Rule 803(6) •... 
727 F.2d at 272. But cj Berger, The Federal Rules of Evidence: Defining and Refining the Goals 
of Codification, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 255, 272-74 (1984) (The question of whether trial judges 
may exclude statements that fall under class exceptions on rule 403 grounds because judges be-
lieve hearsay dangers exist is unsettled.). 
When evidence is offered against a defendant in a criminal case, the confrontation clause may 
require an additional showing of indicia of reliability, DiMaria, 727 F.2d at 272 n.6, though even 
in a criminal case the Supreme Court has suggested that "[r]eliability can be inferred without 
more in a case where evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception." Ohio v. Roberts, 
448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (dictum). 
236. Admissions are not required to be against interest or otherwise accompanied by indicia 
of trustworthiness, see text at notes 117-25 supra, and hence might sometimes be excluded under 
a general reliability test. Similarly, the statements of injured persons about their present symp-
toms, while clearly admissible under federal rule 803(3), can be self-serving when personal injury 
claims are contemplated, and hence might sometimes be excluded under a general reliability test. 
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prove unavailability.231 
The pure notice system has its attractive points. It would address 
the problem of surprise directly and effectively. It would reduce judi-
cial discretion, at least if it were rigidly applied to require that all hear-
say be admitted where notice had been given and all hearsay be 
excluded where notice had not been given. There would still be dan-
gers of jury overvaluation and lawlessness, but those could be con-
trolled to some extent by the trial judge's power to grant a new trial 
when the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. 
However, the pure notice system, if rigidly followed, could lead to 
injustices of its own. Its exclusionary impact would be much too great 
in cases in which notice was overlooked or in which the attorney did 
not learn of the availability of (or the need for) the testimony until 
after the period for giving notice had expired. In fact, it would be 
burdensome even for the most diligent lawyer to give notice of all 
hearsay that will be offered at trial, including hearsay that is routinely 
admitted under the current exceptions. A litigant should not be re-
quired, for example, to give notice that after the accident (1) the plain-
tiff complained about pain, (2) then described his symptoms to a 
doctor who (3) relied upon specified passages from learned treatises in 
237. The British have adopted a notice system for civil trials, though the actual system is 
more complicated than the one I have described. The notice provisions operate as a residual 
exception to the hearsay rule; certain class exceptions are retained and evidence is admissible 
under them even in the absence of notice. Civil Evidence Act, 1968, § 9. If evidence does not fall 
under a class exception, then it is admissible if the proponent gives notice of intent to offer the 
evidence. Civil Evidence Act, 1968, §§ 2(1), 8(2). The opponent of the evidence may, however, 
give counternotice requiring that the person named in the proponent's notice be called as a wit-
ness unless shown to be unavailable. Civil Evidence Act, 1968, § 8(3). The notice exception does 
not apply to second-hand oral hearsay; that is, it does not apply to "evidence other than direct 
oral evidence by the person who made the statement or any other person who heard or otherwise 
perceived it" except when the statement was made in a document. Civil Evidence Act, 1968, 
§ 2(3). (The exception for documents may be subject to a requirement that the person making or 
adopting the document have first-hand knowledge of the matter asserted therein. See R. CROSS 
& c. TAPPER, CROSS ON EVIDENCE 488-89 (6th ed. 1985).) When the notice requirements of the 
Act have been satisfied, the court has no discretion to exclude the hearsay, see Civil Evidence 
Act, 1968, § 8(3); J. BUZZARD, R. MAY & M. HOWARD, PHIPSON ON EVIDENCE§ 17-12, at 
355-56 (13th ed. 1982) [hereinafter PHIPSON ON EVIDENCE), but the court has discretion to 
admit hearsay even if notice has not been given. See Civil Evidence Act, 1968, § 8(3); PHIPSON 
ON EVIDENCE, supra, § 17-14, at 356-57. 
This liberal attitude toward reception of hearsay in civil cases may in part stem from the fact 
that jury trial is extremely rare in English civil cases. See P. DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 130-32 
(1966) (noting that jury trial of right is limited to libel, slander, malicious prosecution, false 
imprisonment, seduction and breach of promise to marry, and fraud cases, and estimating that 
the proportion of civil jury trials in Britain is two or three percent of all civil cases); Cf D. 
CASSON & I. DENNIS, MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 6 (1982) 
(noting limits on jury trial as of right); P. MURPHY & D. BARNARD, supra note 19, at 39 (attrib-
uting liberality of hearsay rule in British civil cases to circumstance that "the issues of fact are 
decided by a judge, who is well able to make the proper allowance, when giving judgment, for the 
fact that some of the evidence has not been subjected to cross-examination"). However, the Civil 
Evidence Act does not limit the liberalization of the hearsay rule to nonjury cases. 
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forming an opinion about the plaintiff's condition. An all-embracing 
notice requirement would be burdensome and frequently overlooked. 
Stipulating that failure to give notice could be excused if it caused no 
prejudice would not completely relieve this burden; the careful lawyer, 
anticipating a claim of prejudice, would still need to submit a detailed 
and exhaustive list. A notice system ought to be supplemented with a 
system of class exceptions, under which some hearsay would be rou-
tinely admitted even in the absence of notice. 
iv. A pure rule of preference. If hearsay were treated as a pure rule 
of preference, then hearsay would be excluded if the declarant were 
available and admitted if the declarant were not available. The rule 
would thus give preference to the best evidence (live testimony) but 
would not stand in the way of admission of evidence when the best 
was not available. 
In its exclusionary aspect, the rule would be too broad unless sup-
plemented with at least a reduced list of class exceptions designed to 
admit hearsay statements of available declarants when the utility of 
cross-examination is outweighed by the cost of producing live wit-
nesses. It would be wasteful to require the testimony of every avail-
able declarant - for example, every declarant in the chain of 
information represented by a business record. 
A pure rule of preference would also be too broad in its other as-
pect, that of receiving hearsay not previously admissible. The idea 
that hearsay should be admitted if the declarant is unavailable is a 
powerful one if one takes into account only the untested declarant the-
ory, since the choice is between admitting the testimony for what it is 
worth or losing the benefit of it altogether, and the fact finder ought to 
be trusted to weigh the evidence for what it is worth. However, when 
one also considers problems of witness fabrication and surprise, the 
rule becomes less attractive. The unavailability of the declarant, while 
it increases the need for admitting the testimony in hearsay form, also 
increases the danger that the opponent will be surprised by fabricated 
testimony. The very fact that the declarant is unavailable makes it 
easier to attribute statements to the declarant that were never made. 
No one is in a position to contradict the witness' assertion that the 
declarant made the statement. Therefore, a rule of preference ought to 
be supplemented with a requirement that the declarant give notice that 
the statement will be offered. This would allow the opponent to pre-
pare on the question whether the statement was made, whether the 
declarant was reliable, and whether the declarant is in fact unavaila-
ble. In the final part of this article, I will evaluate the possibility of 
adopting a rule of preference in the context of a system that retains a 
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list of class exceptions and that supplements the rule of preference 
with a notice requirement. 238 
b. Reforms that retain class exceptions 
Probably the best, or at least most feasible, reform under current 
conditions would be a mixture of those described above, coupled with 
retention of the class exceptions. 
I have tried to demonstrate that, in the absence of complete aboli-
tion, retention of the class exceptions would be a useful feature even if 
the hearsay rule were radically reformed. The class exceptions reduce 
surprise (the opponent can foresee, and prepare to meet, the types of 
hearsay that fall under the class exceptions) and curtail trial court dis-
cretion (by defining types of hearsay that must be admitted). Reten-
tion of the class exceptions as a supplement to a notice system would 
also reduce pretrial paperwork (no notice need be given when hearsay 
is admissible under the class exceptions) and prevent reliable hearsay 
from being excluded for failure to give notice. 
But the class exceptions need improvement. Some, like the excited 
utterance exception, treat a category of hearsay as automatically ad-
missible when its trustworthiness may be no greater than that of ordi-
nary hearsay. Perhaps by broadening the residual exception so that it 
admits hearsay more freely, pressure could be taken off the class ex-
ceptions so that they could be restricted to hearsay that truly deserves 
automatic admission. 
i. A reliability-based residual exception. The current Federal Rules 
of Evidence set forth a system of class exceptions supplemented by a 
reliability-based residual exception. Rule 803(24), and its twin, rule 
804(b)(5), provide: 
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions 
but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness [is 
not excluded by the hearsay rule], if the court determines that (A) the 
statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is 
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evi-
dence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and 
(C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will 
best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a 
statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the propo-
nent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the 
trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to 
prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the particulars 
of it, including the name and address of the declarant. 239 
238. See text at notes 250-55 infra. 
239. FED. R. Evm. 803(24), 804{b){5). 
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This approach is a reasonable compromise. However, it has two 
defects that limit its utility in civil cases. 
First, the notice provision is far too strict. Notice before trial is 
not always feasible;240 in any event, a harmless failure to give notice 
before trial should not result in the exclusion of worthwhile evidence. 
Good faith failure to give notice should not be grounds for exclusion, 
unless the other party has been prejudiced by the failure. Even then, a 
continuance or a rearrangement of the order of proof should be the 
ordinary remedy. Some courts have reached this result without the 
aid of any amendment to the rule,241 but only at the cost of ignoring 
the rule's plain language. The notice requirement should be liberal-
ized in civil cases. 
Second, the rule of preference stated in 803(24) is unduly vague 
and misconceived in its focus. I am referring to the passage requiring 
that the hearsay statement be "more probative on the point for which 
it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure 
through reasonable efforts."242 The rule makes no express distinction 
between available declarants and unavailable ones. When the residual 
exception is invoked as a basis for introducing the testimony of an 
available declarant, then the opponent should have the option of re-
quiring the proponent to produce the declarant and elicit the testi-
mony on direct examination. Provision could be made for shifting 
costs to the opponent if such demands are motivated by a desire to 
create delay or increase expense. 
On the other hand, if the declarant is unavailable, there should be 
no requirement that the evidence be "more probative" than any other 
evidence, so long as it meets the test of reliability and is not merely 
cumulative. If witness A testifies that the light was red, and witness B 
testifies that the light was green, then hearsay declarant C, who is un-
available, should be heard to say that the light was green, even though 
we might consider the declarant's evidence not to be "more probative" 
than that of the in-court witnesses. 
These specific defects could, of course, be cured. The residual ex-
ception could be revised (in civil cases) so that it provided that upon 
notice sufficient to prevent unfair surprise (before or during trial), 
240. Even with diligent efforts, it may not always be possible to give notice before trial. The 
use of hearsay evidence may become necessary because of unanticipated evidence offered by the 
opponent, because of the unexpected failure of a witn~ss to testify, or because of discovery of new 
evidence during trial. For examples of cases in which courts circumvented or ignored the pre· 
trial notice provision of the residual exceptions because notice was not practical under the cir· 
cumstances, see note 206 supra. 
241. See note 206 supra and cases cited therein. 
242. FED. R. Evm. 803(24), 804(b)(S). 
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hearsay would be admissible when it was reliable enough to be a fair 
means of proof. This interstitial reliability test would be a useful re-
form, but its provision for judicial determination of reliability is troub-
lesome and unnecessary. A pure notice-based residual exception 
would be superior. 
In nonjury cases, there is virtually no practical difference between 
a notice-plus-reliability rule and a pure notice rule. The judge who 
excludes hearsay evidence as unreliable under a reliability standard 
would admit it but disregard it under a pure notice standard. So the 
real question is whether, in civil jury cases, an interstitial reliability 
test is superior to an interstitial notice rule without reliability screen-
ing. The latter approach is preferable for the following reasons: 
(a) Reliability screening involves either vesting too much discre-
tion in the trial judge or, as seems to have been the case under the 
existing residual exception, unnecessary appellate litigation leading to 
a hodgepodge of appellate precedent that gives little guidance about 
what is admissible and what is not.243 
(b) The screening function given to the judge does not take advan-
tage of any qualifications that are peculiar to judges (and not to juries). 
Unlike other rules that have prophylactic goals, that protect confiden-
tial relationships, or that otherwise require a long view of the law, the 
screening of hearsay merely involves a judgment of its probative value 
in the case at bar. The jury, if it can be trusted with the testimony of 
interested parties, convicted felons, and other unreliable witnesses, 
ought to be trusted with screening hearsay for reliability. Reliability 
screening makes sense in civil jury trials only if one assumes that juries 
will fatally overvalue hearsay testimony, and that overvaluation can-
not be controlled by other procedural devices. I will argue later that it 
can be controlled, and that reliability screening is therefore 
unnecessary. 244 
ii. A residual exception embodying a rule of preference. A residual 
exception embodying a rule of preference would, in its purest form, 
take the form of a rule that hearsay is admissible when the declarant is 
unavailable. If the declarant is available, then hearsay would be ad-
missible only if it fell within one of the class exceptions. 
The ill-fated Model Code cast the hearsay rule as a rule of prefer-
ence supplemented by a reduced list of class exceptions. 245 It was 
never adopted in any state, and its proposed hearsay reform stirred 
243. See generally Sonenshein, supra note 143 (analyzing the residual exceptions to the hear-
say rule against the backdrop of confused and varying appellate cases). 
244. See text at notes 254-58 infra. 
245. Rule 503 of the Model Code of Evidence provided that "a hearsay declaration is adrnis-
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vehement opposition.246 Nevertheless, it may be time to reconsider 
whether the rule of preference might be a valuable reform if limited to 
civil cases. Even if a pure rule of preference proved unacceptable, com-
promise models of it are available that meet some of the objections 
based upon declarant unreliability or witness fabrication. The existing 
Massachusetts statute247 and rejected rule 804(b)(2)248 are examples of 
limited rules of preference. If broader reform proves unfeasible, these 
rules could provide a model for more moderate reform in civil 
cases.249 
The rule of preference has advantages over current law, but it is 
not the best solution to the hearsay problem in civil cases. In cases in 
which the declarant is unavailable, it raises the danger of unfair sur-
prise by omitting any requirement of notice. Notice should be re-
quired both to allow the opponent to prepare to impeach or contradict 
the out-of-court declarant, and to prepare evidence to contest the un-
availability of the declarant. A notice system that incorporated a rule 
of preference that could be invoked only by counter-notice would both 
allow the opponent to prepare on these points and encourage the par-
ties to agree to the admission of hearsay prior to trial. 
Moreover, even if supplemented with class exceptions, a rule of 
preference would sometimes exclude evidence when the opponent has 
sible if the judge finds that the declarant (a) is unavailable as a witness, or (b) is present and 
subject to cross-examination." MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 503 (1942). 
Other rules provided class exceptions admitting hearsay even when the declarant was avail-
able and not present at trial. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rules 506 (admissions), 512 
(contemporaneous or spontaneous statements), 514 (business records), 515 (public records) 
(1942). 
246. See note 231 supra. 
247. See note 90 supra. 
248. Rule 804(b)(2) in the form promulgated by the Supreme Court provided an exception, 
applicable only when the declarant was unavailable, for 
[a] statement, not in response to the instigation of a person engaged in investigating, litigat· 
ing, or settling a claim, which narrates, describes, or explains an event or condition recently 
perceived by the declarant, made in good faith, not in contemplation of pending or antici-
pated litigation in which he was interested, and while his recollection was clear. 
FED. R. Evrn. 804(b)(2) (Supreme Court Proposed Draft 1973), reprinted in 2 BAILEY & TREL· 
LES, supra note 14, Doc. 7. 
The House Committee on the Judiciary eliminated the rule as "creating a new and unwar-
ranted hearsay exception of great potential breadth," one which, in the Committee's opinion, 
applied to statements that did not bear "sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to justify admis-
sibility." H.R. REP. No. 650, supra note 43, at 6. The rule was not revived and did not appear in 
the version enacted by Congress. 
249. A more comprehensive approach was advocated by Professor James Chadbourn in 
Chadbourn, supra note I. Professor Chadbourn, though sympathetic with the Model Code's 
unqualified rule of preference, recognized that it was not likely to be adopted. He proposed a 
compromise position that distinguished between civil and criminal cases. He proposed adoption 
of a residual exception providing that "[i]n civil cases a statement by a declarant [is admissible] if 
the judge finds that such declarant is unavailable and the statement would have been admissible if 
made by the declarant as a witness." Id. at 951. 
October 1987) Hearsay Reform 119 
no actual need for cross-examination and when acquiring the testi-
mony of the witness would be unduly expensive or burdensome. A 
less categorical preference for live testimony can be built into a notice-
based residual exception. The next section of this article advocates 
such an exception. 
iii. A notice-based residual exception with no reliability screening. 
A notice-based residual exception in civil cases would make no provi-
sion for reliability screening by judges, but would depend upon other 
procedural safeguards to reduce the impact of unreliable evidence. 
Such an exception has great promise when judged in light of the prin-
cipal objections to radical reform of the hearsay rule. These objections 
have been based upon fear that free reception of hearsay would cause 
surprise at trial, that reform would increase judicial discretion, and 
that reform would lead to the reception of unreliable evidence. 
Objections based upon surprise and discretion do not apply to a 
pure-notice residual exception. Notice would eliminate surprise, and 
the trial judge would have no discretion to exclude evidence on 
grounds that it raised hearsay dangers. Judges would, admittedly, 
have some discretion in deciding whether late notice was sufficient, but 
litigants could usually avoid this exercise of discretion by careful 
planning. 
The principal remaining objection to free admissibility is the unre-
liability of hearsay evidence. This objection can be met by incorporat-
ing procedural safeguards into a notice system. 
The substitution of hearsay for more reliable live testimony could 
be avoided by combining a notice system with a rule of preference. 
The notice of intent to introduce hearsay under the exception should 
state whether the declarant is available or unavailable. The opponent 
should have the option of demanding that the declarant be produced 
at trial and examined, first by the proponent and then by the oppo-
nent. 250 If the opponent made such a demand, the proponent should 
be required either to demonstrate unavailability, produce the declar-
ant, or forego use of the residual exception and attempt to find a basis 
for admission under a conventional class exception. This procedure 
recognizes that it is generally appropriate to place the burden of pro-
ducing a witness upon the party who benefits from the witness' testi-
mony. In cases in which this generalization does not apply, or in 
which frivolous claims of availability are advanced, the trial judge 
250. The provision that the declarant be examined first by the proponent, rather than merely 
being offered for cross-examination, would be designed to prevent the proponent from achieving 
an undeserved tactical advantage. Cf text at note 208 supra. 
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could be authorized to shift costs to the opponent.251 
Upon notice, hearsay statements of declarants who are unavaila-
ble, or who are available and produced for testimony, would be freely 
admissible. This provision would allow the introduction of prior con-
sistent and inconsistent statements for substantive purposes in civil 
cases. The right to cross-examine the witness on the stand, coupled 
with the absence of considerations that make one hesitate to admit 
such statements in criminal cases, 252 provide an adequate justification 
for admitting such statements upon proper notice. Of course, the trial 
judge's power to regulate the taking of testimony under rule 611 and 
to exclude evidence that is cumulative or a waste of time under rule 
403 could be exercised to prevent the witness from taking the stand to 
read a prepared statement in lieu of ordinary direct examination. The 
trial judge could, for example, provide that the statement not be ad-
mitted until after the completion of the direct examination of the wit-
ness on the facts in issue, and then only if the statement was not 
cumulative or a waste of time. 253 
With this provision, the opponent of the hearsay would be de-
prived of the opportunity to cross-examine only in cases in which the 
declarant was unavailable. These cases present the strongest instance 
for admission of hearsay evidence. The choice is between admitting 
the untested evidence for what it is worth or having nothing at all. 
The argument for exclusion rests on the assumption that the jury will 
fatally overvalue the testimony and that it is better not to hear it at all 
than to take the chance of overvaluation. 254 This argument is based 
upon a highly questionable view of the jury's capacities, and in any 
event to handle the problem by exclusion is to overlook less drastic 
methods of dealing with the danger of overvaluation. These include 
argument by counsel about the unreliability of hearsay, judicial in-
structions about the weight to be given hearsay, judicial comment 
upon the evidence, and, when things have gone drastically wrong, the 
use of the judge's power to grant a new trial on grounds that the ver-
dict is against the weight of the evidence.255 
251. Both would be subject to the provisions of rule II of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, which provides for the award of sanctions, including attorney's fees, for the filing of papers 
that are not well grounded or that are interposed for purposes such as delay. 
252. See text at notes 109-10 supra. 
253. Cf Civil Evidence Act, 1968, § 2(2) (giving judge discretion whether to admit an out-of· 
court statement of a person being called as a witness). 
254. See text at notes 32-42 supra. 
255. On the use of these procedural devices to mitigate the possibly prejudicial effect of hear· 
say, see generally Weinstein, supra note 8; 3 J. BENTHAM, supra note I, at 553: 
[T]he assumption is, that, if the jury were suffered to hear the evidence, they would be sure 
to be deceived by it. Experience, had judges but patience to consult her, would have super-
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Reliance upon the new trial remedy to correct hearsay-induced 
miscarriages of justice might, at first, seem to reintroduce all the disad-
vantages of reliability screening at a later stage, since it does involve a 
discretionary decision by the trial judge on the basis of an assessment 
of reliability. However, the new trial approach has advantages over 
the exclusion approach. First, it allows deliberate consideration of the 
probative value of the evidence after the reception of all the evidence 
and of the jury's verdict. Second, it does not finally terminate the case 
by excluding crucial evidence. It protects the opponent of the evi-
dence against an idiosyncratic first jury, but leaves the proponent, in 
the absence of settlement, with the opportunity to try the case before a 
second jury. If the second jury returns a verdict in favor of the propo-
nent, it is highly unlikely that the trial judge will grant a third trial. 256 
Even with these safeguards, the specter of free admissibility of all 
hearsay in civil cases will make this proposal unattractive to many 
lawyers. The proposal could be limited by restricting the application 
of the notice-based residual exception to first-hand hearsay from de-
clarants with personal knowledge.257 This provision would prevent 
the admission of anonymous rumors and other particularly objectiona-
ble hearsay without relying upon discretionary screening. When relia-
ble, double hearsay could still come in under the conventional 
exceptions to the hearsay rule. A requirement of first-hand hearsay 
would also limit the impact of the notice-based residual exception 
upon pretrial disposition of frivolous cases. It would not be possible, if 
the requirement were imposed and properly tailored, to avoid a mo-
tion for summary judgment by alleging facts on information and be-
lief. Rather, a specific hearsay declarant would have to be identified, 
and the basis for personal knowledge shown. 
Finally, rule 403 of the Federal Rules258 would serve to limit the 
seded the demand for this rash suspicion. Will they be deceived by it? [S]tay and see. 
Should their decision prove erroneous, then, and not till then, it may be proper to take 
measures for obtaining a new one. 
256. See Frank v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 177 F. Supp. 922 (D.D.C. 1959), affd., 280 
F.2d 628 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (trial judge should defer to second jury, in absence of exceptional 
circumstances); 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 86, § 2803, at 35. 
257. Cf Civil Evidence Act, 1968, § 2(3) (establishing a general requirement that hearsay 
testimony about oral out-of-court statement, when admissible under notice-based exception, 
must be in the form of "direct oral evidence by the person who made the statement or any person 
who heard or otherwise perceived it being made"). The goal of this section is to ensure that only 
first-hand hearsay is admissible under the notice-based exception. See R. CROSS & C. TAPPER, 
supra note 237, at 488. 
258. Rule 403 provides that "evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or 
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evi-
dence." FED. R. Evm. 403. 
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admission of hearsay that would be prejudicial, confusing, or a waste 
of time. In administering rule 403 under a notice-based residual ex-
ception, however, trial judges should be required to assume the credi-
bility of declarants in the same way that they must now assume the 
credibility of live witnesses, and make decisions about confusion, pre} 
udice, and waste of time on the assumption that the declarant's state-
ment is true. Otherwise, rule 403 would become merely another way of 
adding reliability screening to 'the decision whether to admit hearsay. 
CONCLUSION 
In criminal cases, the currently existing strictures against hearsay 
should be retained. In civil cases, however, further liberalization of 
the hearsay rule is justified. The Federal Rules of Evidence should be 
amended to include a notice-based residual exception that permits 
hearsay to be admitted in civil cases without being screened for relia-
bility by the trial judge. This approach would eliminate problems of 
surprise and discretion that have been features of other proposed re-
forms. The danger of jury overvaluation of hearsay could be ade-
quately met by procedural devices other than exclusion of evidence. 
